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Illinois Childcare Parentage Law (R)Evolution
Jeffrey A. Parness*
State childcare parentage laws, that is, laws designating parents for
custody, visitation, parental responsibility allocation, parental
decisionmaking and/or support purposes, have evolved dramatically in the
past half century. The (r)evolution is due to major changes in both
reproductive technologies and human conduct. Yet the (r)evolution is
incomplete.
The (r)evolution is especially incomplete in Illinois. Recent statutory
amendments in Illinois chiefly reflect the work of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in its 2000 model Uniform Parentage
Act, not its 2017 Uniform Parentage Act. The latter better addresses the
effects on childcare parentage of the changes in both reproductive
technologies and human conduct. As well, the latest Illinois statutes do not
reflect the NCCUSL’s 2018 model Uniform Nonparent Child Custody and
Visitation Act which also address the changes in the ways in which American
families are formed and reformed by expecting and existing legal parents.
Finally, the 2019 draft of the American Law Institute Restatement of the Law
on Children and the Law has only recently been available to Illinois
lawmakers.
Any (r)evolution in Illinois childcare parentage laws should not be fully
fueled by the NCCUSL or ALI pronouncements. While a few other states
have substantially embraced the 2017 UPA, it embodies certain public policy
choices over which lawmakers can quite reasonably differ. As well, the 2017
UPA presents significant constitutional challenges.
Parentage law (r)evolution in Illinois is chiefly the responsibility of the
General Assembly. When asked to develop broad childcare parentage
norms, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously deferred, finding the
complex issues merit broad “policy debate” in the General Assembly.
Illinois legislators will be challenged when contemplating new parentage
laws. The laudable goals of promoting certainty, recognizing the import of
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blood ties, furthering children’s best interests, respecting family members’
wishes, protecting parental rights, and enhancing public welfare often
cannot be simultaneously pursued. Yet the General Assembly must act.
Neither Congress nor the United States Supreme Court is likely to soon
demand more national uniformity on parentage. Thus, as with many other
family law matters (like marriage dissolution, heirs in probate, and standing
to sue in tort), lawmaking on childcare parentage will substantially remain
for state lawmakers.
This Article first briefly notes some recent significant changes in
technology and human conduct impacting legal parentage. Then it examines
the federal constitutional boundaries on state childcare parent laws. Next it
explores the diverse array of models, statutes and precedents on childcare
parentage now operating outside of Illinois. Then it looks at current Illinois
parental childcare laws. Finally, the Article elaborates on some of the key
questions facing Illinois legislators when considering new childcare
parentage norms.
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INTRODUCTION
State childcare parentage laws, that is, laws on those who are parents
for custody, visitation, parental responsibility allocation, and/or parental
decision-making purposes, have evolved dramatically in the past halfcentury.1 The (r)evolution was fueled by major changes in both
reproductive technologies and human conduct. Yet this (r)evolution is
incomplete.
The (r)evolution is especially incomplete in Illinois. Recent statutory
amendments chiefly reflect the work of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in its 2000 model
Uniform Parentage Act (2000 UPA),2 not its 2017 model Uniform
Parentage Act (2017 UPA) which better addresses the effects on childcare
parentage of the changes in both reproductive technologies and human
conduct.3 As well, the latest Illinois statutes do not reflect the NCCUSL’s
2018 model Uniform Nonparent Child Custody and Visitation Act (2018
UNCVA), which also addresses the changes in the ways in which US
1. The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA) no longer speaks of
parental custody and visitation. Rather, it speaks of parental responsibility allocation, which may
or may not include parental decision-making authority, but which does include “parenting time.”
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.5, 602.7, 602.8 (2020). Herein, the term childcare parentage usually
excludes child support parents. Elsewhere, the phrase “childcare parent” might be reasonably
utilized to encompass not only custody, visitation, parental responsibility allocation, and parental
decisionmaking, but also child support.
2. See generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000, amended 2002). The
UPAs, and accounts of their adoptive states, are available at the Uniform Law Commission (ULC)
website. Home, UNIF. LAW COMMISSION, www.uniformlaws.org [https://perma.cc/5RL2-XQ4C].
3. For a review of the 2017 UPA, its predecessors, which include both the 2000 and 1973 UPAs,
and the goals behind the 2017 model, see Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the
UPA (2017), 127 YALE L.J.F. 589, 597–99 (2018). Those versions of the UPA are available on the
ULC website. UNIF. LAW COMMISSION, supra note 2.
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families are formed and reformed.4 Further, the 2019 draft of the
American Law Institute (ALI) Restatement of the Law on Children and
the Law (2019 ALI Draft)5 has not been considered by Illinois
lawmakers,6 though the earlier (and somewhat different) ALI Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution were available.7
Any (r)evolution in Illinois childcare parentage laws should not be
fully fueled by the NCCUSL or ALI pronouncements. While a few other
states have substantially embraced the 2017 UPA,8 it embodies certain
public policy choices over which lawmakers can quite reasonably differ.9
As well, and more importantly, the 2017 UPA presents significant
constitutional challenges.10
Parentage law (r)evolution in Illinois is chiefly the responsibility of the
General Assembly. When asked to develop broad childcare parentage
norms, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously deferred, finding the
complex issues merit broad “policy debate” in the General Assembly.11
4. See generally UNIF. NONPARENT CUSTODY & VISITATION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
5. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No.
2, 2019).
6. As the drafting process for the 2017 UPA was underway when major Illinois parentage law
amendments were recently enacted, and as the 2019 ALI Draft was preceded in 2002 by the
somewhat comparable 2002 ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, certain parentage
law reforms embodied in the 2017 UPA and in the 2019 ALI Draft, including de facto parentage,
were presented, though not adopted in Illinois, as will be seen. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
7. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 2.03(1)(a)–(c) (suggesting three
categories of childcare parentage, including legal parents, parents by estoppel, and de facto
parents).
8. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.005–.903 (2020) (citing the Uniform Parentage Act,
effective Jan. 1, 2019); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 101 (2020) (citing the Vermont Parentage Act,
effective July 1, 2018).
9. For example, Illinois lawmakers have yet to adopt parentage via employment of genetic
surrogates. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/10 (2020).
10. I have written on a number of these questions. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Choice of
Law in De Facto Parent Cases: Tweaking the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, 88 MISS. L.J. SUPRA
1 (2020); Jeffrey A. Parness, Faithful Parents: Choice of Childcare Parentage Laws, 70 MERCER
L. REV. 325 (2019); Jeffrey A. Parness, Comparable Pursuits of Hold Out and De Facto Parentage:
Tweaking the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, 31 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 157 (2018) [hereinafter
Parness, Comparable Pursuits]; Jeffrey A. Parness, Unnatural Voluntary Parentage
Acknowledgements Under the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act, 50 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 25 (2018)
[hereinafter Parness, Unnatural VAPs].
11. In re Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 795 (Ill. 2015) (finding that this “complex area” is
evolving). However, the court is open to developing common law norms in some assisted
reproduction settings, as where there are preconception pacts on future childcare parentage. See,
e.g., In re M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. 2003) (noting common law claims of parentage and
support of children can be pursued on “theories of oral contract or promissory estoppel” that extend
beyond the reach of the Illinois Parentage Act). Outside of Illinois, some state courts give far less
deference. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, State Lawmaking on Federal Constitutional Childcare
Parents: More Principled Allocations of Powers and More Rational Distinctions, 50 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 479 (2017) [hereinafter Parness, More Principled Allocations].
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Illinois legislators will be challenged when contemplating new
childcare parentage laws. The laudable goals of promoting certainty,
recognizing the import of blood ties, furthering children’s best interests,
respecting family members’ wishes, protecting parental childcare rights,
and enhancing public welfare often cannot be simultaneously pursued.
Yet the General Assembly must act. Neither Congress nor the United
States Supreme Court is likely to demand soon more national uniformity
on childcare parentage.12 Thus, as with many other family law matters
(like marriage dissolution, heirs in probate, and standing to sue in tort),
lawmaking on childcare parents will substantially remain for state
lawmakers, who will need to set new guidelines with the rise of same-sex
marriages, the increasing use of assisted reproduction technologies, and
the continuing fluidity of family relationships.
This Article first briefly notes some recent significant changes in
technology and human conduct impacting childcare parentage. Then it
examines the federal constitutional boundaries on state childcare parent
laws. Next it explores the diverse array of models, statutes and precedents
on childcare parentage operating today in the United States. Then it looks
at current Illinois childcare parent laws. Finally, the Article elaborates on
some of the key questions facing Illinois legislators when considering
new childcare parentage norms in light of scientific and social changes.
I. CHANGING REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND FAMILY
RELATIONSHIPS
A. Changing Technologies
In the past half century there have been at least two major technology
advances prompting parentage law (r)evolution. One involves the
increasing availability of reliable, less costly, and less intrusive DNA
testing to determine male parentage, including testing to determine
prebirth (future) male parentage.13
The other significant advance involves more reliable, less costly and
generally available processes for assisted human reproduction, including
births via artificial inseminations or implanted embryos.14
12. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents, 90 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 965, 969 (2016) [hereinafter Parness, Constitutional Childcare Parents] (noting that while
the United States Supreme Court or Congress may constrain state parental childcare lawmaking,
each is now unwilling to act, though the stated rationales for inaction are weak at best).
13. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Before Birth, Dad’s ID, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/health/paternity-blood-tests-that-work-early-in-apregnancy.html [https://perma.cc/8HRS-PMUD].
14. Assisted reproductive technology is generally defined in 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(1) (2019). For
a review of available procedures and state laws, see Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 20 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 313 (Jenna Casolo et al. eds., 2019).
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Other technological advances have also prompted, and call for more,
legal reforms. New processes now allow better freezing and storage of
genetic materials so that later retrieval and use will more likely prompt
healthy human births. Further, new processes now permit a prebirth
determination of the sex of any later born child, as well as make available
safer intended pregnancy terminations.15
B. Changing Families
As to changes in human conduct, in the past half century there has been
a significant rise in births from consensual sex to unwed mothers who
never marry the biological fathers and who raise their children alone.16
As well, there are rising numbers of stepparents, grandparents, and others
(e.g., aunts, uncles, and siblings) chiefly rearing children.17 Changing
15. On the forms and advances in assisted reproduction technologies, see Caroline A. Harman,
Comment, Defining the Third Way—The Special-Respect Legal Status of Frozen Embryos, 26 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 515, 517–25 (2018).
16. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA.
L. REV. 649, 652 n.9 (2008); Elizabeth Wildsmith, Nicole R. Steward-Streng & Jennifer Manlove,
Childbearing Outside of Marriage: Estimates and Trends in the United States, CHILD TRENDS,
Nov. 2011, at 1, 1, available at https://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/
Child_Trends-2011_11_01_RB_NonmaritalCB.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLR9-27TK] (“In 2009, 41
percent of all births (about 1.7 million) occurred outside of marriage, compared with 28 percent of
all births in 1990 and just 11 percent of all births in 1970.”). While there have been increases for
all racial groups, the numbers for black birth mothers are highest. GREGORY ACS ET AL., THE
MOYNIHAN REPORT REVISITED 4 (2013), available at https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/
publication/23696/412839-The-Moynihan-Report-Revisited.PDF
[https://perma.cc/NYR5DQGB] (“In the early 1960s, about 20 percent of black children were born to unmarried mothers,
compared with 2 to 3 percent of white children. By 2009, nearly three-quarters of black births and
three-tenths of white births occurred outside marriage. Hispanics fell between whites and blacks
and followed the same rising trend.”); see also JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS,
No. 1, at 38–40 (vol. 64, 2015), available at https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/
nvsr64/nvsr64_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBW5-TUAK]; GREGORY ACS ET AL., supra, at 4 (“In
1960, 20 percent of black children lived with their mothers but not their fathers; by 2010, 53 percent
of all black children lived in such families. The share of white children living with their mothers
but not their fathers climbed from 6 percent in 1960 to 20 percent in 2010. Again, Hispanics
followed the same trend and fell between whites and blacks. The bulk of the increase in the share
of kids in ‘mother, no father’ families occurred by 1990; the growth has largely moderated over the
past two decades.”); Tonya L. Brito, Complex Kinship Networks in Fragile Families, 85 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2567, 2569–74 (2014).
17. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63–64 (2000) (O’Connor, J., joined by three
justices) (“[W]hile many children have two married parents and grandparents who visit regularly,
many other children are raised in single-parent households. . . . Understandably, in these singleparent households, persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to
assist in the everyday task of child rearing.”). See also Michael J. Higdon, The Quasi-Parent
Conundrum, 90 COLO. L. REV. 941, 953–62 (2019) (reviewing data and cases on children living
with stepparents, cohabitating partners, and same-sex couples); David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a
Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood,
54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 132–36 (2006). The Pew Research Center provides excellent reviews and
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human conduct has prompted more nontraditional families, including
many headed by wed or unwed same-sex couples who plan for, have, and
rear children together, as well as families embodying a single parent with
a child or children.
II. FEDERAL LAW BOUNDARIES
State parentage laws are guided by federal constitutional boundaries
chiefly set out in United States Supreme Court decisions. These rulings
recognize significant discretion for state lawmakers, which has resulted
in diverse state laws. While the decisions have only addressed parentage
for children born of sex, the diversity extends to children born of assisted
reproduction (with or without surrogacy).
In Lehr v. Robertson, in 1983,18 the Supreme Court ruled that a
biological father of a child born of sex acquires “substantial” federal
constitutional childrearing interests only after forming a “significant
custodial, personal or financial relationship” with his child.19 Prior to
formation, a biological father only has a less-protected parental
opportunity interest, meaning, for example, he has no right to advance
notice of an adoption petition by another man when this opportunity
interest had not been timely seized.20 By contrast, a birth mother
necessarily has a significant relationship with any child she bears, so there
always arise substantial childcare interests at birth.21
Of course, Lehr need not be (and should not be) limited to biological
fathers for children born of sex. Both male and female genetic material
donors who prompt assisted reproduction births should have, in the
absence of waiver, protected parental opportunity interests.
And of course, the limited federal constitutional protections of parental
opportunities for certain biological parents (e.g., rapists not included)
does not mean there are not other more significant constitutional
protections. Some state constitutional precedents, for example, have
extended greater protections to unwed male parentage interests than are
federally required.22
analyses of the changing family structures in the United States, often reporting on the latest Census
Bureau data. Social & Demographic Trends, PEW RES. CTR., www.pewsocialtrends.org
[https://perma.cc/YZ2X-5U6B].
18. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
19. Id. at 271.
20. Id. at 266.
21. See Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001) (noting the meaningful relationship between
birth mother and child inheres “in the very event of the birth”); see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 397 (1979).
22. See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999); In re Interest of J.W.T.,
872 S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994) (finding state constitutional law parentage opportunities for
unwed biological fathers where the birth mothers are married to others).
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In Michael H. v. Gerald D., in 1989,23 a plurality in the Supreme Court
narrowed an unwed biological father’s federal constitutional parental
opportunity interest when a child is born into a “unitary family,” that is,
a “family unit accorded traditional respect in our society,” typified “by
the marital family” as well as by a “household of unmarried parents and
their children.”24 There was a narrowing because there was held to be no
automatic federal constitutional parentage opportunity interest for an
unwed biological father where a child was born to a married woman then
raising that child with her spouse. There, under state law at the time, the
husband of the birth mother was the conclusively presumed childcare
father as long as he was neither impotent nor sterile.25 Had either the
mother or her husband objected to the presumed spousal parentage within
two years of the child’s birth, however, an opportunity interest to
childcare might then have arisen for the unwed biological father per Lehr,
as the state law then allowed the birth mother or her husband to challenge
the presumed paternity presumption.26 There was no clear majority in
Michael H. elaborating on the constitutional interests of unwed
prospective biological fathers.27
In Troxel v. Granville, in 2000,28 the Supreme Court limited state
lawmaking affording child custody interests to nonparents over the
objections of existing legal parents whose “fundamental” parental rights
had been recognized.29 The precise limits remain unclear, however. In
particular, it is uncertain whether detriment or harm to the child must be
established before such nonparental interests can be recognized.30
Beyond Lehr, Michael H., and Troxel, there is the 1983 Supreme Court
ruling in Roe v. Wade.31 There, and in later cases, both prospective
spousal parents and unwed biological parents were denied a say in certain

23. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
24. Id. at 123 n.3.
25. Id. at 115 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (1993) (repealed 1994)). Justice Stevens joined
the Scalia-led plurality of four justices in deeming this statute prevented the unwed natural father
from being a parent under California law should the unitary family remain intact; but he did find
the unwed father had, under California Civil Code § 4601, since repealed, an opportunity as a
nonparent for “reasonable” visitation rights. Id. at 133–34.
26. Id. at 113 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621).
27. Five justices in Michael H. v. Gerald D. recognized such interests might be available for
children born to women who were married to others. See id. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Five
members of this court refuse to foreclose the possibility that a natural father might even have a
constitutionally protected interest in his relationship with a child whose mother was married to, and
cohabiting with, another man at the time of the child’s conception and birth”).
28. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63–64 (2000) (O’Connor, J., joined by three justices).
29. Id. at 66.
30. The open question and the diverse state law answers are reviewed in UNIF. NONPARENT
CUSTODY & VISITATION ACT § 4 cmt. 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018).
31. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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decisions on pregnancy termination by prospective birth mothers who
were accorded broad decision-making authority under federal
constitutional privacy interests.32 Decisionmaking on future parenthood
can involve not only pregnancy termination, but also pregnancy
establishment. Roe and its Supreme Court progeny have not addressed to
what extent decisions to prompt pregnancy, especially via assisted
reproduction (with or without a surrogate), are protected from
governmental interference by federal constitutional privacy interests.33
III. THE (R)EVOLUTION IN STATE CHILDCARE PARENTAGE LAWS
A. New Uniform Parentage Act and ALI Principles
Current Illinois parental and nonparental childcare laws reflect neither
the models proffered in the 2017 UPA and 2018 UNCVA nor the 2019
ALI Draft Restatement on Children and the Law. What new NCCUSL
32. Id. at 163 (for the period of pregnancy prior to the end of the first trimester, a decision to
abort made upon consultation between the attending physician and the pregnant woman can be
“effectuated . . . free of interference by the State”).
33. See Ann MacLean Massie, Regulating Choice: A Constitutional Response to Professor John
A. Robertson’s Children of Choice, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135 (1995) (urging that the optimal
(not minimal) well-being of future children is the appropriate basis to shape social policy on
assisted human reproduction); Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457 (2008) (reviewing scholarship and finding
no general right to use assisted reproduction, though any legislation recognizing its use in some
contexts should generally be read to extend use in other contexts); Tandice Ossareh, Note, Would
You Like Blue Eyes With That? A Fundamental Right to Genetic Modification of Embryos, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 729 (2017) (exploring the parameters of a cognizable right to genetic modification
of an embryo, whether to restore health or to enhance the traits of a future child). Elsewhere I have
criticized the Court for not elaborating on such privacy interests. See Parness, Constitutional
Childcare Parents, supra note 12, at 978–83 (showing that the Court looks to the exceptions to
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction for many family (and probate) matters to justify deference to
state lawmakers, though the rationales for those exceptions (e.g., lack of federal social service
agencies when child custody is disputed) do not warrant the failure to set, by precedent, additional
nationwide norms on who possess the fundamental parental right to the care, custody and control
of children). Others have also thoughtfully criticized the Court and urged a greater federal
constitutional recognition of who qualifies as a childcare parent. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman,
Constitutional Parentage, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 340 (2017) (“[W]hile courts are generally
cognizant of constitutional parental rights and their potential relevance to parentage determinations,
they do not always grapple with those rights in ways that reflect a full grasp of their importance or
a consensus on the best way to resolve the points of tension.”); Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional
Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2018) (“[T]he Supreme Court must offer more
guidance on how states may define constitutional parenthood,” though “a definitive definition of
the term is both impractical and unrealistic.”); Douglas NeJaime, The Constitution of Parenthood,
72 STAN. L. REV. 261, 262 (2020) (noting the “functional vision of parenthood,” though arising
from state family laws, “reflects and extends important constitutional commitments in ways that
shed light on the parent-child relationships that merit recognition as a matter of due process”); Dara
E. Purvis, The Constitutionalization of Fatherhood, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 541, 541 (2019)
(using “modern precedents to provide a clearer theory of constitutionalizing fathers”); see generally
Mark Strasser, Custody, Visitation, and Parental Rights Under Scrutiny, 28 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 289 (2018).
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and ALI guidelines, and what current state childcare parent laws, speak
well to the new reproductive technologies and to changing familial
relationships, thus meriting consideration by Illinois lawmakers?
B. Spousal Parentage
All UPAs recognize childcare parentage in actual and would-be
spouses of birth mothers. The 1973 UPA deems “a man is presumed a
natural father of a child if . . . he and the child’s mother are or have been
married to each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within
300 days after the marriage is terminated.”34 So, a man’s marriage to a
pregnant or nonpregnant woman prompts parentage in the man for a child
born or conceived during the marriage, whether or not the man is a
biological parent. For children born into marriage via “artificial
insemination” utilizing the semen not donated by the husbands, there are
additional requirements for male spousal parentage, including that the
husband “consent” and that there be “supervision of a licensed
physician.”35
The 2000 UPA, as amended in 2002, similarly recognizes presumptive
spousal parentage for children born of sex and nonpresumptive spousal
parentage via consent to “assisted reproduction.” Further, it recognizes
nonpresumptive spousal parentage via a “validated” gestational mother
“agreement.”36 No actual biological ties are required in many instances
of spousal parentage.
The marital parent presumption in the 2000 UPA expressly applies to
a man married to the mother when “the child is born.”37 As to a child born
to a married mother via assisted reproduction, a husband is a parent if he
“provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction” per the UPA
requisites.38 Within two years of birth, the husband may dispute paternity
34. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973). The 1973, 2000, and 2017
UPAs also recognize male parentage presumptions in certain men who married or attempted to
marry the natural mothers before or after the births. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(3)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1)(c), (a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). State laws include 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/204(a)(3) (2020) and CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (2020).
35. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (noting that other forms of artificial
insemination, raising “complex and serious legal problems,” are not dealt with). Failure to follow
Section 5 mandates may nevertheless prompt a marital parentage presumption under Section 4 for
a child born of artificial insemination. See, e.g., id. § 4(a)(1) (showing the husband is a presumed
natural father of a child born to his wife “during the marriage”).
36. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(b)(1), (5)–(6) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
37. Id. § 204(a)(1)–(2). As with the 1973 UPA, there is also a marital parentage presumption
for a man who attempted to marry the birth mother before the child’s birth and the child is born
“during the invalid marriage,” or within 300 days after its termination, § 204(a)(3), as well as for a
man who married or tried to marry the mother “after the birth of the child” and who “voluntarily
asserted his paternity of the child,” § 204(a)(4).
38. Id. § 703 (providing the consent requisites in Section 704).
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if he did not provide sperm or consent.39 However, if the husband did not
provide sperm and did not consent, he may pursue “at any time” an
adjudication of nonpaternity where he and the mother “have not
cohabited since the probable time of assisted reproduction” and he “never
openly held out the child as his own.”40 As to a child born to a gestational
carrier where there is a validated agreement, a husband and his wife are
parents unless the agreement is terminated.41
The 2017 UPA also recognizes spousal parentage. It expressly applies
to both male and female spouses42 who are married to the birth mothers
at the time of birth.43 Such presumptive parentage does not, and should
not, arise for those marrying expecting or existing legal fathers. This is
because the bar on three legal parents usually would be implicated since
there is also usually another expecting or existing legal parent, the
prospective or actual birth mother whose constitutional custodial interests
are fundamental and arise automatically upon birth.
Nonpresumptive spousal parentage under the 2017 UPA attaches to
consenting spouses of birth mothers, as under the 2000 UPA, who give
birth via “assisted reproduction.”44 Further, nonpresumptive spousal
parentage also attaches to married spouses where there are either
gestational or genetic surrogacy agreements.45
Current state laws generally reflect the policies of the UPAs on spousal
parentage. Yet not all states comparably implement these policies. For
example, under some laws spousal parentage can arise from a marriage
in existence at the time of birth or at the time of conception, or from a
marriage in existence sometime during pregnancy though not at
conception or birth.46
39. Id. § 705(a).
40. Id. § 705(b).
41. Id. § 806.
42. To date, only a few states expressly recognize marital parentage in the female spouse of a
birth mother. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.A.115(1)(a) (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, §
401(a)(1) (2020).
43. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
44. Id. § 703 (coinciding with the consent requisites in Section 704).
45. Id. §§ 802–807 (outlining comparable requirements for each form of agreement, with
additional special rules for gestational surrogacy pacts, at §§ 808–812, and for genetic surrogacy
pacts, at §§ 813–818).
46. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-20 (2019) (stating that a child “born in wedlock or within
the usual period of gestation thereafter” is legitimate); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(a)(1)
(2020) (stating that there is presumptive paternity if a man is married “at any time in the ten months
preceding the birth”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.1433(e) (2019) (defining “presumed father” as
the man “who is presumed to be the child’s father by virtue of his marriage to the child’s mother at
the time the child’s conception or birth”); see also State v. EKB, 35 P.3d 1224, 1229–30 (Wyo.
2001) (holding that there were two spousal parents as birth mother was married twice during
pregnancy; first husband was presumed spousal parent as child was born within 300 days of his
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Current state laws, like the UPAs, do not address spousal parentage in
common law marriages. Yet some state precedents do consider common
law marriages when assessing custodial interests during family
disputes.47
Spousal parentage constitutes a form of parentage by consent for those
without biological or formal adoption ties. Such parentage has been
recognized in all three UPAs and is grounded in the inferred consents to
share custody that inheres in actual or attempted marriages between
expecting or existing legal parents and their actual or would-be spouse.48
Consents arise when the marriage ceremony occurs (or is attempted).49
Consents to parentage encompass future children, whether or not now
conceived, as well as some current living children.50
While such consents are undertaken comparably by actual or
prospective birth mothers and their spouses, the circumstances allowing
later spousal parentage disestablishments might vary, for example, where
only one of the spouses knows of an existing pregnancy. Variations in
spousal parentage disestablishments might also vary when state public
policies differ on the importance of biological ties for an alleged legal
parent who is not the birth mother. Biological ties are less, or not,
important where, as recognized in Obergefell v. Hodges, marriage is
deemed “the basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits

divorce, while second husband was presumed spousal parent as he was married to birth mother at
the time of birth); Ex parte Kimbrell, 180 So. 3d 30, 34–35, 39 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2015) (holding
that when a child born to woman and her supposed second husband, though there was no divorce
from her first husband; both men were presumed spousal parents).
47. See, e.g., Valentine v. Wetzel, No. 790 MDA 2018, 2019 WL 1130441, at *8 (Pa. Super.
Ct. Mar. 12, 2019) (applying earlier common law marriage norms to conduct before 2005 since the
bar was not made retroactive even though state law barred common law marriages entered into after
January of 2005); In re Marriage of Hogsett and Neale, No. 2018 COA 176, at ¶¶ 1–2, 2018 WL
6564880, at *1 (Colo. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2018) (applying Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015), retroactively to give same-sex couple right to prove common law marriage for purposes of
a dissolution proceeding), cert. granted in part, No. 19SC44, 2019 WL 4751467 (Sept. 30, 2019);
Gill v. Nostrand, 206 A.3d 869, 873 (D.C. 2019) (applying common law marriage doctrine in a
case involving alimony and marital property).
48. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1)–(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 204 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
49. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (stating that consent occurs);
id. § 4(a)(2) (attempted); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (occurs);
id. § 204(a)(3) (attempted); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1)(A) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017)
(occurs or attempted).
50. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (referring to a future child);
id. § 4(a)(3) (referring to a current child); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2000) (referring to a future child); id. § 204(a)(4) (referring to a current child); UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 204(a)(1)(A) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (referring to a future child); id. § 204(a)(1)(C)
(referring to a current child).

2020]

Illinois Childcare Parentage Law (R)Evolution

923

and responsibilities,” including child custody and support.51 So,
biological ties are not very important where a child is born of consensual
sex into a marriage wherein the nonbirth spouse is not a genetic parent,
but is a presumed parent whose childcare parentage presumption is, at
best, difficult to overcome by a person (usually an alleged biological
father) outside the marriage.52 By contrast, in Vermont, biological ties are
more important as a presumed parent is a person who is married to the
birth mother at the time of the birth of a child born of consensual sex,
where an alleged unwed genetic father may challenge the presumption
within two years of discovering “the potential genetic parentage.”53 By
further and greater contrast, in Iowa and Texas,54 there are significant
state constitutional protections of the parental opportunity interests of
biological parents (logically, for children born of assisted reproduction as
well as consensual sex).
C. Voluntary Acknowledgment Parentage
All UPAs recognize childcare parentage in those who have undertaken
a voluntary parentage acknowledgment (VAP). Unlike spousal
parentage, with VAPs there are clearly actual consents to parentage by
those then either expecting or existing legal parents and by those then
nonparents who may have no biological or marital ties.
The 1973 UPA recognizes “a man is presumed to be the natural father
of a child” if “he acknowledges his paternity in a writing” filed with the
state which is not disputed by the birth mother “within a reasonable time
after being informed.”55 Rebuttal of such a presumption occurs only with

51. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492, 495–96, 500 (Ariz. 2017) (extending marital
paternity presumption to female spouse of birth mother; Arizona spousal parentage presumption
statute, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(A)(1) (2019), does not specifically reference any
likelihood of biological ties in the spouse, but rather addresses the spouse’s rights and
responsibilities).
52. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion)
(opining that the federal constitution does not bar a marital parentage presumption law where the
presumption cannot be rebutted by an unwed genetic parent); Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052,
1052–53 (Pa. 1999) (holding that the marital presumption not rebuttable by genetic father where
marriage is intact); B.S. v. T.M., 782 A.2d 1031, 1036–37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (finding no
irrebuttable marital parent presumption here as the marriage was not intact at relevant times). While
an unwed biological father may not himself be able to petition for an adjudication of child custody
parentage, he may still be able to be pursued, as by state welfare officials seeking welfare payment
reimbursements, for an adjudication of child support parentage, especially when a cuckolded
husband is disestablished as a presumed parent. See, e.g., Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 A.2d 459, 469
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
53. VT. STAT. ANN. tit.15C, § 401(a)(1) (2020); id. § 402(b)(2) (finding that the court may
choose not to disestablish the spousal parentage presumption).
54. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125–26.
55. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
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“clear and convincing evidence of no biological ties,” along with “a court
decree establishing paternity of the child by another man.”56
The 2000 UPA recognizes no parentage presumption for a male VAP
signor.57 It does recognize the birth mother and “a man claiming to be the
father of the child conceived as the result of his sexual intercourse with
the mother may sign an acknowledgment of paternity with intent to
establish the man’s paternity.”58 That UPA declares a VAP can be
rescinded within sixty days of its effective date by a “signatory.”59
Thereafter, a signatory can commence a court case to “challenge” the
VAP, but only on “the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact”
within two years of the VAP filing.60
The 2017 UPA also recognizes that VAPs nonpresumptive parentchild relationships.61 Parentage establishments can be undertaken by an
expanded field of VAP signatories, including those who claim to be “an
alleged genetic father” of the child born of sex;62 a presumed parent (man
or woman) due to an alleged or actual marriage; a presumed parent due
to a holding out of the child as one’s own while residing in the same
household with the child “for the first two years of the life of the child;”63
and, an intended parent (man or woman) in a nonsurrogacy, assisted
reproduction setting.64 Unlike earlier UPAs, VAPs may be undertaken “at
the birth of the child or the filing of the document with the [state agency
maintaining birth records], whichever occurs later.”65
As with the 2000 UPA, the 2017 UPA allows signatories to rescind
within sixty days.66 Challenges may proceed thereafter, “but no later than
two years after the effective date” and “only on the basis of fraud, duress
or material mistake of fact.”67 While nonsignatory VAP challenges may
be pursued within “two years after the effective date of the
56. Id. § 4(b).
57. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
58. Id. § 301. The accompanying Comment indicates that “a sworn assertion of genetic
parentage of the child” is needed though not “explicitly” required by federal welfare subsidy
statutes that often prompt state VAP laws, a federal statutory “omission” that is corrected in the
2000 UPA. The Comment also recognizes a male sperm donor may undertake a VAP in an assisted
reproduction setting where his “partner” is the birth mother.
59. Id. § 307(1).
60. Id. § 308(a).
61. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). Some marital parentage
presumptions, including marriages occurring after birth, can be prompted by parentage assertions
in records filed with the state. Id. § 204(a)(1)(C)(i).
62. Id. § 301.
63. Id.; id. § 204(a).
64. Id. §§ 301, 703.
65. Id. § 304(c).
66. Id. § 308(a)(1) (allowing rescission within two months of their effective dates).
67. Id. § 309(a).
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acknowledgement”, challenges usually will only be sustained when the
child’s “best interest” will be served.68 Nonsignatory challengers are
limited. Those with standing include the child; a parent under the 2017
UPA; “an individual whose parentage is to be adjudicated;” an adoption
agency; and a child support, or other authorized, governmental agency.69
The 2017 UPA expressly recognizes that VAPs may be undertaken by
those who know there are no biological ties to the children whom they
acknowledge.70 This is new and revolutionary. The 2017 UPA allows
circumvention of formal adoption laws and the safeguards they provide
for children, including background checks and best interest findings. A
comment in the 2000 UPA laments that the federal statutes guiding state
VAP laws do not expressly “require that a man acknowledging paternity
must assert genetic paternity;” it indicates the 2000 UPA was “designed
to prevent circumvention of adoption laws by requiring a sworn statement
of genetic parentage of the child.”71 Thus, in 2017, the NCCUSL policy
on VAPs changed dramatically. The change not only runs counter to
formal adoption laws, but presents constitutional issues involving, at the
least, possible as applied challenges (likely under Lehr).
Many current state laws reflect the policies of the UPAs on VAPs.
Only a few states to date have extended VAP authority to a same-sex
female couple where a child is born of consensual sex.72 VAP
opportunities are not, and could not be, extended to a same-sex male
couple where one of the men conceived a child born of sex, as here the
birth mother is a parent and no states, as yet, recognize VAPs for third
parents.73

68. Id. § 309(b); id. § 610(b)(1)–(2).
69. Id. §§ 610(b), 602. Thus, the parents or siblings of an alleged biological father of a child
born of consensual sex seemingly cannot challenge a VAP.
70. Id. § 301 (recognizing intended parent for child born of assisted reproduction and spousal
parent, who is a presumed parent under § 204(a)(1)(A), like a woman married to the birth mother).
71. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art III. cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
72. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 301(a)(4) (2020); id. § 401(a)(1) (allowing a person
married to birth mother at time child is born can undertake voluntary parentage acknowledgment);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.200 (2020) (permitting a birth mother and “presumed parent” may
sign acknowledgment; presumed parent includes the spouse of birth mother under
26.26A.115(1)(a)(i)). On the need for allowing VAPs for same-sex female couples, see, e.g., Jessica
Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward: Extending Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage to Female
Same-Sex Couples, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97, 101–03 (2018) (examining same-sex female
couples who conceive children using donated sperm). On the problems with two women signing
VAPs for children born of consensual sex, see Parness, Unnatural VAPs, supra note 10, at 25
(articulating concerns regarding lost paternity interests for unwed biological fathers involving
children born of consensual sex).
73. In California, there can be three parents under law. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (2020). But
one such parent cannot be a parent via a VAP. Id.; CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (noting that voluntary
parentage acknowledgment does not prompt presumed parentage).
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State VAP statutes today only sometimes involve parentage
presumptions. With or without presumptions,74 VAP statutes typically
recognize that signed and state-filed parentage declarations establish
childcare parentage for signors who are not birth mothers. Sometimes
VAPs operate without alleged biological ties.75 They generally operate
without formal adoptions. As well, state VAP laws vary in their
disestablishment standards, though all norms, due to federal welfare
subsidy mandates, must conform to the federal Social Security Act.76
VAP statutes most often are employed by birth mothers and unwed
men who seek to establish legal paternity.77 VAPs are typically
distinguished from birth certificate recognitions of childcare parents
encompassing those married to birth mothers, who frequently are
presumed parents, but who never undertake VAPs. 78 VAP parents who
reside and hold out children as their own also differ from residency/ hold
out parents who never undertake VAPs,79 as a VAP is more difficult to
challenge than a residency/hold out parentage.

74. For a review of state voluntary acknowledgment statutes, see Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary
Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth,
40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 63–69 (2010) [hereinafter Parness & Townsend, For Those Not John
Edwards]; Jayna Morse Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity: Should Biology
Play a Role in Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?, 38 IND. L. REV. 479, 482 (2005).
75. In Alaska and Nevada, the VAP forms do not speak to biological ties. The signing man
indicates only that he is the “father.” ALASKA BUREAU VITAL STAT., FORM NO. 06-5376 VS FORM
16: AFFIDAVIT OF PATERNITY (rev. Jan. 2009); NEV. VITAL RECORDS, FORM NO. NSPO:
DECLARATION OF PATERNITY (rev. July 2008). In Vermont, a woman residing with a birth mother
for the first two years of a child’s life is eligible to sign a VAP. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 301(a)(4)
(2017); id. § 401(a)(4). In Wyoming and Washington, there is no explicit requirement that the
signing man affirm a belief in biological ties, though the signor elsewhere is referred to as the
“natural father.” VITAL RECORDS SERVS., STATE WYO., AFFIDAVIT ACKNOWLEDGING
PATERNITY (rev. 2017); CTR. FOR HEALTH STAT., WASH. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, FORM NO.
DOH/CHS 021: PATERNITY AFFIDAVIT (rev. Sept. 2007). The foregoing VAP forms, and others
later referenced, are on file with the author, who assembled them while writing For Those Not John
Edwards. See generally Cacioppo, supra note 74, at 489–91.
76. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-93, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a review of
disestablishment (i.e., rescissions and challenges) norms, see PAULA ROBERTS, CTR. FOR LAW &
SOC. POLICY, TRUTH AND CONSEQUENCES, pt. I, at 44–53 (2003); id. app. B, at 82–90 (including
table citing all statutes).
77. But see In re Sebastian, 25 Misc. 3d 568, 583 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2009) (suggesting woman
whose ova was used by her partner to bear a child born of assisted reproduction might employ the
voluntary acknowledgment process).
78. See, e.g., Castillo v. Lazo, 386 P.3d 839, 842 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that a birth
certificate naming husband is not “equivalent” to a VAP).
79. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 301(a)(4) (2020); id. § 401(a)(4) (stating that a
presumed holdout/residency parent may, but need not, sign a VAP).
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In only some states can VAPs be filed and effective prior to birth.80
And only in some states must information as to any completed genetic
testing be submitted; must forms be used by residents for out-of-state
births; are witnesses or notaries needed; and must forms require parental
or guardian consent when the signing mothers are young.81
Notwithstanding any statutorily-designated “conclusive” status, VAPs
can be rescinded by signatories within sixty days. After sixty days, VAPs
can only be challenged in court on the basis of fraud, duress or material
mistake of fact.82 For states participating in federal welfare subsidy
programs, these standards are required by the federal Social Security
Act.83 Yet, state cases reflect significant interstate variations in the fraud
duress and mistake guidelines for VAP challenges, with no Congressional
or federal court movement, as yet, to unify state VAP challenge
standards.84
Beyond fraud, duress, and mistake, there are other differences in state
VAP challenge laws. For example, there are varied time limits on VAP
challenges. Even with fraud, duress, or mistake, challenges must be
commenced within a year in Massachusetts,85 within two years in
Delaware,86 and within four years in Texas.87 In Utah, a statutory
challenge may be made “at any time” on the ground of fraud or duress,
but only within four years for material mistake of fact.88 Where there are
no written time limits, (often quite broad) trial court discretion reigns.89
80. See, e.g., VITAL STATISTICS UNIT, TEX. DEP’T STATE HEALTH SERVS., FORM NO. VS-1591M: TEXAS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY (2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 304(b)
(2020).
81. For a review of the varying state forms, see Parness & Townsend, For Those Not John
Edwards, supra note 74, at 63−87.
82. Jeffrey A. Parness & David A. Saxe, Reforming the Processes for Challenging Voluntary
Acknowledgments of Paternity, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 184 (2017) [hereinafter Parness & Saxe,
Reforming VAPs].
83. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)–(iii) (2019). At least one state statute combines its norms on
disestablishing presumed marital paternity and its norms on challenging VAPs. ALA. CODE § 2617-608(a)(1) (2020).
84. For more on such variations, see, e.g., Parness & Saxe, Reforming VAPs, supra note 82, at
194–96.
85. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 11(a) (2020); see also State v. Smith, 392 P.3d 68, 76 (Kan.
2017) (holding that there is an one year (after birth) limit on signatory challenges applied though
there were found technical violations (e.g., no proper notarizations) of the statute).
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-308(a)(2) (2019); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 308(a)(2)
(2020); Paul v. Williamson, 322 P. 3d 1070, 1073 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit.
10, § 7700-609(B) (2020)) (employing Oklahoma two-year limit against alleged biological father).
But see LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:406 (2019) (stating that the two-year prescriptive period previously
imposed for revocation of authentic acts of acknowledgement was repealed in 2016).
87. TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 160.308(a) (West 2019).
88. UTAH CODE. ANN. § 78B-15-307 (LexisNexis 2020).
89. See, e.g., In re Neal, 184 A.3d 90, 96 (N.H. 2018) (holding that there was sustainable
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Further, there are interstate differences in whether a successfully
challenged VAP eliminates past child support arrearages.90
Importantly, particularly for nonsigning biological fathers of children
born of consensual sex, there are some laws on the circumstances beyond
fraud, duress, and mistake available to challenge VAPs. Consider
challenges by nonsigning biological fathers who did not know that other
men, or women in some states, were signing VAPs alongside birth
mothers, and who did not know of, and did not reasonably foresee, their
“potential parentage.” In Vermont, such a father may challenge a VAP
within two years after discovery of his “potential parentage,” as in cases
where there was “concealment” of the pregnancy and/or birth though
there was no fraud, duress, or mistake.91 Elsewhere, “concealment” of a
pregnancy and/or of a live birth by the birth mother (and, at times, others)
may not extend the time for a biological father to challenge a VAP,
assuming there is standing, because strict repose periods operate.92
Finally, again particularly important for nonsigning biological fathers
(and their family members), state laws vary on which nonsignatories can
challenge VAPs. In Vermont, a challenge is available to “a person not a
signatory.”93 Elsewhere, standing to challenge a VAP is far more limited,
as with laws recognizing only certain types of challengers, like children
and governments.94
D. Residency/Hold Out Parentage
All UPAs recognize childcare parentage in some of those who have
resided with living children whom they held out as their own.
Residency/hold out parentage is a form of parentage for those without
biological or formal adoption ties. To date, no UPA (and no state law)
has recognized residency/hold out childcare parents where there is

exercise of trial court discretion where a 2009 VAP was challenged by male signatory in 2015 after
a 2012 paternity test revealed that he was not the biological father; challenge brought in November
2015, after child contact was cut off in March 2014).
90. See, e.g., Adler v. Dormio, 872 N.W.2d 721, 722 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (reviewing
Michigan laws on when responsibility for arrearages may be eliminated).
91. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 308(b).
92. See, e.g., Parness & Saxe, Reforming VAPs, supra note 82, at 198−200 (noting also that
VAP challenges within the relevant time limits may be foreclosed by laches or estoppel).
93. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 308(b).
94. See, e.g., Parness & Saxe, Reforming VAPs, supra note 82, at 188–94. While the 2017 UPA
expressly recognizes a VAP may be challenged by a nonsignatory, the 2000 UPA only explicitly
recognizes signatory challenges. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 309(b), 610(b) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2017) (proceeding “brought by an individual other than the child”), with UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 308(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000). See also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(5)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973); id. § 6(b) (“[A]ny interested party may sue to disestablish an
acknowledged father.”).
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common residency with, and support of, expecting legal parents (i.e.,
pregnant women or those awaiting formal adoption approval).
The 1973 UPA is quite different than the latter UPAs on
residences/hold out parentage.
The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act has this parentage presumption:
(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of the child if . . .
(4) while the child is under the age of majority, he receives the child
into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.95

The 2000 Uniform Parentage Act altered the presumption. It says:
(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if: . . .
(5) for the first two years of the child’s life, he resided in the same
household with the child and openly held out the child as his own.96

The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act altered again the presumption. It
says:
(a) An individual is presumed to be a parent of a child if: . . .
(2) the individual resided in the same household with the child for the
first two years of the life of the child, including periods of temporary
absence, and openly held out the child as the individual’s child.97

While expanding VAPs in 2017 by including women, the last two
UPAs limited childcare parentage opportunities for those living with, and
supporting, nonmarital, nonbiological, and nonadoptive children without
VAPs or assisted reproduction pacts. Since 2000, an alleged
residency/hold out parent must begin to childrear upon the child’s birth.
The 2000 ALI Principles also recognize forms of residency/hold out
parentage. One form, like the 2000 and 2017 UPAs, encompasses “a
parent by estoppel” who “lived with the child since the child’s birth,”
while holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as
parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child’s legal
parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child
together each with full parental rights and responsibilities.98 Another
form, as with the 1973 UPA, encompasses a “de facto parent” who lived
and established a parental-like relationship with the child, again with a
similar agreement and with comparable mandates on holding out and
accepting responsibility.99
Many current state laws reflect the policies of the UPAs on
residency/hold out parentage. Yet only a few to date have expressly

95. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
96. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000).
97. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
98. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.03(1)(b)(iii) (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (requiring a finding of serving the child’s best interests).
99. Id. § 2.03(1)(b)(iv) (requiring a finding of serving the child’s best interests).
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extended it to same-sex couples.100 Nevertheless, residency/hold out
parentage seems available to a female partner of a birth mother given
equality demands.101 Residency/hold out parentage is generally
unavailable to a male partner of a birth father where there is a birth mother
who remains a legal parent, since state laws allowing three custodial
parents are quite limited.102
There are varying state laws reflecting the distinct UPA approaches to
residency/hold out parentage. In California, following the 1973 UPA, a
man is “presumed to be the natural father of a child” if he “received the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.”103
There is no explicit requirement that a man who holds out a child as “his
natural child” needs to have any beliefs about his actual biological ties.
Thus, California cases104 have recognized as presumed parents those who
knew there were no biological ties, but who acted in the community as if
100. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 401(a)(4) (2020) (“person,” not man); WASH. REV.
CODE. § 26.26A.115(1)(b) (2020) (“individual,” not man). On the need to treat equally men and
women involved in same-sex residency/hold out parentage settings, see Jeffrey A. Parness,
Marriage Equality: Parentage (In)Equality, 32 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 179, 189 (2017).
101. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 670 (Cal. 2005) (finding former unwed
lesbian partner a child support parent under California statutory law on presumed natural hold out
fathers); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 967 (Vt. 2006) (first citing VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 308(4) (2017) (repealed 2018); and then citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f)
(2020)) (holding that upon dissolution of civil union of lesbian couple, both women are custodial
parents as statute making husband the presumed “natural parent” of a child born to his wife was
applicable via a second statute saying that civil union and married couples shall have the “same”
rights). Similar equality mandates operate when there is common law, rather than statutory, hold
out parentage. See, e.g., Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 45 N.Y.S.2d 845, 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014)
(“The Court of Appeals majority quoted, with approval, the Vermont Supreme Court opinion in
Miller-Jenkins v. Miller Jenkins, which held that a partner in a civil union was the parent of a child
born during the civil union.” (citation omitted)); see also Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties
to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their Children, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195,
212–19 (2014) (explaining that even where statutes only explicitly recognize residency/hold out
parentage for men, women are sometimes deemed parents under the statutes).
102. In California, though, there can sometimes be three legal parents, including the birth
mother, her spouse, and a residency/hold out parent. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West
2020) (allowing three parents where recognition of only two parents “would be detrimental to the
child”), with C.G. v. J.R., 130 So. 3d 776, 782 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that Florida law
does not support enforcement of an agreement on sharing child custody which was entered into by
the married birth mother, her spouse, and the biological father of a child born of sex).
103. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2020). The presumption has been sustained when
challenged on the ground of interfering with federal constitutional childcare interests. See, e.g.,
R.M. v. T.A., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (using the preponderance of evidence
norm to establish presumption). For what constitutes receipt into the home, see, e.g., In re N.V.,
G049597, 2014 WL 2616503 (Cal. Ct. App. June 12, 2014) (reviewing cases).
104. See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 15 (Cal. 2004) (declaring both Paul (also the husband)
and Heriberto (also the biological father) to be “presumed” California fathers because each had
received Jesusa V. into his home and held her out as his natural child); see also Barnes v. Cypert,
No. F049259, 2006 WL 3361790 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2006) (holding that the birth mother’s
uncle is a presumed parent); In re Jerry P., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that presumed residency/hold out parent need not have, or even claim to have, biological ties).
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there were.105 Elsewhere, some state laws recognize residency/hold out
parentage only for those who raise children from birth,106 following the
2017 UPA.
There are other interstate variations in residency/hold out parentage.
Some state laws do not require receipt into the home.107 Some state laws
more explicitly require existing legal parents to agree to such matters as
residency or hold outs by nonparents who can later morph into new
childcare parents, on equal footing with existing legal parents.108
State laws vary on the circumstances allowing, and the standing
available to present, a challenge to residency/hold out parentage.
Consider challenges by nonresident biological fathers who did not know,
and could not reasonably have known, that residency/hold out was being
undertaken by a nonparent together with an existing legal parent (often
the birth mother). In Vermont, such a father may challenge a hold
out/residency parentage within two years of “discovering the potential
genetic parentage” in cases where there was no earlier actual or
reasonably assumed knowledge of the potential due to “material
misrepresentation or concealment.”109 Elsewhere, there are different time
limits,110 as well as the unavailability of “concealment” as a condition of

105. How long an alleged residency/hold out parent must so act is determined on a case-by-case
basis. See, e.g., In re J.B., B291208, 2019 WL 1451304, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 2, 2019)
(concluding that two-day hold out is insufficient for presumed parent status).
106. Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West 2019) (stating that a man is a
presumed father if “during the first two years of the child’s life, he continuously resided in the
household in which the child resided and he represented to others that the child was his own”), and
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.115b (2020), with MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(d)(1) (2019) (stating
that a person is presumed the natural father if “while the child was under the age of majority” and
the person “receives the child into the person’s home and openly represents the child to be the
person’s natural child”).
107. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(4) (West 2020) (stating that either the parent
receives into his home or “provides support for the child”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)
(2019) (requiring a “parental role” and “bonded and dependent relationship . . . that is parental in
nature”).
108. Compare D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1) (2020) (stating that a single parent’s “agreement” to
same household residency for one wishing to be deemed a de facto parent), and VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15C, § 401(a)(4) (2020) (finding that presumed residency/ hold out parent if in child’s first two
years, where “another parent” of child jointly held child out as presumed parent’s child), with N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 9:17-43(a)(4)–(5), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40 (stating that a man can be
“presumed to be the biological father of a child on equal footing with the unwed birth mother, if he
“openly holds out the child as his natural child” and either “receives the child into his home” or
“provides support for the child”).
109. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 401(a)(4); id. § 402(b)(2).
110. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (looking at the
residence/hold out in child’s first two years), and id. § 204(b), and id. § 608(b) (dictating that a
presumption rebuttal usually must be presented before the child turns two), with UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (considering the residence/hold out where child is
“under the age of majority”), and id. § 6(b) (“at any time”).
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extending the normal time limits for challenging hold out/residency
parents.111
No state to date follows the 2000 ALI Principles on parentage by
estoppel, where co-parenting pacts with potential residency/hold out must
be undertaken by, if there are, two existing legal parents.112 Nevertheless,
the 2000 ALI Principles seem right for many cases, as one existing legal
parent, as in a formal adoption setting, generally has no agency/common
authority to surrender the parental childcare rights of a second existing
legal parent.
E. De Facto Parentage
The 2017 UPA, but neither of its predecessors, expressly recognizes
“de facto” parenthood as a form of parentage for those without biological
or formal adoption ties.113 Such parenthood is grounded in far more
explicit agreements for shared custody between existing legal parents and
nonparents than in any agreements leading to residency/hold out
parentage.114 For de facto parentage, an existing legal parent must have
“fostered or supported” a “bonded and dependent relationship” between
the child and the nonparent who may become a de facto parent.115 The
nonparent must have undertaken “full and permanent” parental
responsibilities.116
The 2017 UPA de facto parentage provision is also far more precise in
its details on parental-like acts than in its requisites for a two-year
111. Compare UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017), and id. §
204(b), and id. § 608(b) (placing a two year limit on challenging residency/hold out parentage of
an “individual” does not operate when the individual is “not a genetic parent, never resided with
the child, and never held out the child as the presumed parent’s child”), with UNIF. PARENTAGE
ACT § 204(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000), and id. § 204(b), and id. § 607(b) (placing a twoyear limit on actions to disprove earlier determined presumed residency/hold out parentage in a
“man” does not operate when there was, in fact, no cohabitation or sexual intercourse during the
probable time of conception and the presumed parent never openly held out the child as his own),
and UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973), and id. § 6(b) (presumed
residency/hold out parentage can be challenged “at any time”).
112. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.03(1)(b)(iii) (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
113. The term “de facto” parent did not originate in the 2017 UPA. The Comment to the Act
indicates its de facto parentage standard was modeled on Maine and Delaware statutes. UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 609 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). The term was also employed in the 2000
ALI Principles. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(b)(iii) (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
114. Expecting legal parents are foreclosed under the 2017 UPA from being bound to any
agreements on de facto parentage for children to be born of sex later, as the model law requires,
e.g., “a bonded and dependent relationship with the child.” UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609(d)(5).
Thus, there is not recognized a possible “bonded and dependent relationship” with a fetus, a
fertilized egg, or some child of sex yet unconceived.
115. Id. § 609(d)(6).
116. Id. § 609(d)(3).
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residency/hold out parentage. While both de facto parentage and
residency/hold out parentage encompass human acts occurring at no
particular time or in no particular place, only de facto parentage requires
all of the following conditions:
(a) A proceeding to establish the parentage of a child under this section
may be commenced only by an individual who: (1) is alive when the
proceeding is commenced; and (2) claims to be a de facto parent of the
child.
(b) An individual who claims to be a de facto parent of a child must
commence the proceeding (1) before the child is 18 years of age and (2)
while the child is alive. . . .
...
(d) In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of an individual who
claims to be a de facto parent of the child, if there is only one other
individual who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child, the
court shall adjudicate the individual who claims to be a de facto parent
to be a parent of the child if the individual demonstrates by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(1) the individual resided with the child as a regular member of the
child’s household for a significant period;
(2) the individual engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
(3) the individual undertook full and permanent responsibilities of a
parent of the child without expectation of financial benefit;
(4) the individual held out the child as the individual’s child;
(5) the individual established a bonded and dependent relationship with
the child which is parental in nature;
(6) another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded and
dependent relationship required under paragraph (5); and
(7) continuing the relationship between the individual and the child is
in the best interest of the child.
(e) In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of an individual who
claims to be a de facto parent of the child, if there is more than one other
individual who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child and
the court determines that the requirements of paragraphs (1) through (7)
of subsection (d) are met, the court shall adjudicate parentage under
Section 613, subject to other applicable limitations in this [part].117

Of particular note is the 2017 UPA requirement that an existing legal
parent (i.e., “another parent”) “fostered or supported” the parental-like
relationship between the child and the nonparent. There is no mention of
any conduct-consensual or otherwise-involving any second existing legal
parent (like a VAP parent or a presumed spousal parent), or any expecting
legal parent (like a biological father of a child born of sex who maintains

117. Id. § 609(a)–(b), (d)–(e).
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a paternity opportunity interest). An unmentioned parent may not even
know of “another” parent’s fostering and support while it happens. Under
the UPA, it is quite conceivable that the fostering and support nonparent
is later deemed a de facto parent concurrent with the (effective)
termination of, or reduction in, the unaware expecting or existing parent’s
childcare interests.118 Significant constitutional issues arise where there
are other, unaware parents.
On challenges to earlier determined de facto parentage, the 2017 UPA
is relatively silent. It does provide, however, that a child is not bound by
an earlier de facto parentage finding unless “the child was a party or was
represented” in the earlier proceeding.119 Further, it recognizes that a
party with standing “to adjudicate parentage”120 may not challenge an
earlier de facto parentage finding if that party was a party to the earlier
proceeding or received notice of the earlier proceeding.121
Further noteworthy is the 2017 UPA’s restriction on who may attempt
to establish de facto parenthood. Standing is limited to a putative parent
who seeks such status.122 So, the consent to parent is one-way. The
118. Id. § 613 (stating where there is no state law recognition of the possibility of three or more
custodial parents, a court must “adjudicate parentage in the best interest of the child,” with guiding
factors enumerated). In the 2017 UPA, there is provided no express and significant mechanism for
a second existing legal, or an expecting legal parent, to challenge a petition to establish de facto
parentage. Id. Under the 2017 UPA, § 609(e), beyond the birth or adoptive parent, if there is another
individual “who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child” for whom an alleged de facto
parent seeks parental status, that individual’s interests must be adjudicated, id. § 609(e). Yet how
would a court learn of this individual? And is it reasonable to assume that such an individual would
likely know of the de facto parent petition and thus be able to intervene? Should there not be a duty
to disclose, if not an affirmative responsibility for some governmental investigation? In Vermont,
which substantially enacted the 2017 UPA, an alleged de facto parent’s petition to adjudicate
his/her “claim to parentage” is to be determined by “clear and convincing evidence,” with no
explicit statutory mention of the participatory rights of a nonresidential person with “a claim to
parentage.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501(a)(1), (b) (2020); but see id. §§ 206(a)(6), 501(b)
(stating that when courts consider claims of de facto parentage, the court must consider the
“likelihood” of “harm to the child”). Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2019) (imposing
de facto parent norms, wherein there is not any presumed parentage if the norms are met), with
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-609(b) (2019) (allowing an adjudicated father to be challenged within
two years after the adjudication). While findings of de facto parentage in favor of petitioners can
effectively terminate (and can certainly reduce) parentage or parental opportunity interests for
many, such findings, unlike findings in formal adoption proceedings, need not—at least expressly
under the statutes—be preceded by reasonable attempts to notify those whose parental interests are
possibly terminated should the petitions be granted.
119. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 623(b)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
120. Id. § 602 (stating that standing is recognized for an individual, personally or through an
authorized legal representative, “whose parentage of the child is to be adjudicated”).
121. Id. § 611(b) (coupling with notice governed by § 603, which includes “an individual whose
parentage of the child is to be adjudicated,” which seemingly could include a non-birth mother who
claims to be a biological parent and thus claims protected parentage opportunity interests). Of
course, as in formal adoption proceedings, notice may never reach such a biological parent, as when
notice is served by publication.
122. Id. § 609(a) (stating that a claimant must be “alive when the proceeding is commenced”).
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nonparent meeting the de facto parent norms cannot be pursued for child
support by the fostering and supportive legal parent, by any other legal
parent, by the child, or by the state (for welfare payment reimbursement).
This restriction stands in stark contrast to residency/hold out parentage
under the 2017 UPA which generally recognizes standing in the woman
who gave birth, a child, the state, and an adoption agency, as well as in
the putative parent.123 The differences in the standing norms present
significant Equal Protection and public policy concerns.124
Both the 2000 ALI Principles125 and the 2019 ALI Draft126 also
recognize forms of “de facto” parentage for those without biological or
formal adoption ties. Each of the forms requires both residence and
consent by an existing legal “parent.” But only the 2000 Principles further
recognize a “parent by estoppel.”127
Under the 2000 ALI Principles, a “parent by estoppel” is “not a legal
parent” who must have lived with the child, without an obligation to pay
child support and without “a reasonable, good-faith belief” of biological
ties, and who did so with either “a prior co-parenting agreement with the
child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents)” or
“an agreement with the child’s parent (or, if there are two legal parents,
both parents).”128
The 2000 ALI Principles recognizes the “de facto parent” as the one
who is “other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel” and who lived
with and cared for the child for at least two years under an “agreement of
a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship.”129 A de facto parent,
123. Id. § 204(a)(2) (stating that residency/hold out parentage presumed). Per the 2017 UPA
§ 602, limits on such pursuits are found in § 608 (stating that there is usually no pursuit of rebuttal
of presumption after the child is two years of age). Id. §§ 602, 608.
124. See generally Parness, Comparable Pursuits, supra note 10.
125. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§§ 2.03(1)(c), 3.02(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 2002) (listing requirements including residence with the
child, as well as “the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship” unless the
legal parent completely fails, or is unable, to perform caretaking functions”).
126. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82(a) (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (outlining requirements include residence with the child, as well as
establishing that “a parent consented to and fostered the formation of the parent-child
relationship”).
127. Under the 2002 ALI Principles, a legal parent, a parent by estoppel, and a de facto parent
each has standing to pursue/participate in an action involving judicial allocation of custodial and
decision-making responsibility for a child. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
§ 2.04(1). A “legal parent” is “an individual who is defined as a parent under other state law.” Id.
§ 2.03(1)(a).
128. Id. § 2.03(1)(b).
129. Id. § 2.03(1)(c). Alternatively, a de facto parent is one who is other than a legal parent or
a parent by estoppel and who lived with and cared for the child for at least two years “as a result of
a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions.” Id. Precedents
predating the 2000 ALI Principles recognize the concept of de facto parentage in different settings.
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unlike a legal parent or a parent by estoppel, has no presumptive right to
“an allocation of decision-making responsibility for the child,130 and a de
facto parent has no presumptive right of “access to the child’s school and
health-care records to which legal parents have access by other law.”131
The 2019 ALI Draft describes a de facto parent as a third party who
establishes that he or she “lived with the child for a significant period of
time,” was “in a parental role” long enough that he/she established “a
bond and dependent relationship . . . parental in nature,” he or she had no
“expectation of financial compensation,” and “a parent” consented to
third party’s parental-like role.132 So, the 2019 Draft, but not the 2000
ALI Principles, invites a childcare parentage designation adversely
impacting the childcare interests of an existing and nonconsenting parent.
Before and since 2017, some states had or have statutes or common
law precedents on nonmarital, nonbiological, and nonadoptive childcare
parentage similar to the suggested UPA and ALI de facto parent norms.
For example, before 2017 there were quite comparable Maine and
Delaware statutes,133 and a less comparable Wisconsin Supreme Court

See, e.g., In re Kieshia E., 859 P.2d 1290, 1296 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (finding standing of a de
facto parent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding); In re J.H., 815 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Wash. 1991)
(en banc) (holding that in a delinquency case, permissive intervention, not intervention as of right,
is available to some foster parents claiming de facto (or psychological) parent status), superseded
by statute, Act of May 7, 1993, ch. 241, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 864, as recognized in In re E.H.,
427 P.3d 587, 593 n.2 (Wash. 2018); In re B.G., 523 P.2d 244, 254 n.21 (Cal. 1974) (failing to
resolve whether a de facto parent may have the same rights of notice, hearing or counsel as have
natural parents in Juvenile Court Law proceedings under due process or equal protection
principles). The Reporter’s Notes to the 2000 ALI Principles observes the “law that most closely
approximates the criteria for a ‘de facto’ parent relationship is that of Wisconsin” where visitation
(but not custody) may be awarded “to an individual who has formed a ‘parent-like relationship’
with a child.” PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 reporter’s note (c) (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
130. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 2.09(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
131. Id. § 2.09(4).
132. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: CHILDREN AND THE LAW § 1.82(a) (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2019) (requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence).
133. ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1891 (2019); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (2019).
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precedent,134 that were utilized by the drafters of the 2017 UPA.135 Since
2017, a few states have statutorily recognized 2017 UPA de facto
parenthood.136
Current de facto parentage laws vary. In Delaware, a de facto parent
can be judicially recognized for one who had “a parent-like relationship”
with “the support and consent of the child’s parent,” who exercised
“parental responsibility,” and who “acted in a parental role for a length
of time sufficient to have established a bonded and dependent relationship
with the child that is parental in nature.”137 In Washington, a de facto
parent resides with the child for a significant period, engages in consistent
childcare, expects no financial compensation for acting in parental-like
way, has a bonded and dependent relationship parental in nature, and has
the support of another parent.138
On occasion, statutes within a single state can recognize both
residency/hold out and de facto parents who are neither biologically-tied
134. In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 434 (Wis. 1995) (evincing a parental-like relationship
can prompt visitation rights when in child’s best interests). There are common law precedents
elsewhere. In 2008 the South Carolina Supreme Court, adopting a Wisconsin high court analysis,
determined that a nonparent was eligible for psychological parent status if a four-prong test was
met. Marquez v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 743–44 (S.C. 2008) (citing H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at
435–36) (setting out norms for nonparent child visitation orders); see also Conover v. Conover,
146 A.3d 433, 446–47 (Md. 2016) (using H.S.H.-K. in recognizing de facto parent doctrine). And
in 2009, a federal appeals court noted that the Mississippi Supreme Court had long recognized that
a person standing “in loco parentis,” meaning “one who has assumed the status and obligations of
a parent without a formal adoption,” has the same “rights, duties and liabilities” as a natural parent.
First Colony Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 555 F.3d 177, 183 (5th Cir. 2009) (first citing Favre v.
Medders, 128 So. 2d 877, 879 (Miss. 1961); and then citing Worley v. Jackson, 595 So. 2d 853,
855 (Miss. 1992)). By contrast, in some states where there are no de facto parent statutes, courts
choose not to develop precedents because any new de facto parentage norms are the responsibility
of state legislators. See, e.g., Parness, More Principled Allocations, supra note 11, at 480 (“[S]tate
high courts generally need to defer to state legislators when state statutes clearly define
parentage.”). For a forceful argument on the need for continuing the common law “equitable
parenthood doctrine” even where there are statutes, see generally Jessica Feinberg, Whither the
Functional Parent? Revisiting Equitable Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’
Increased Access to Obtaining Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55 (2017).
135. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 609 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
136. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.440 (2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501 (2020).
137. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(a)(4) (2019) (enumerating the requirements for the
establishment of a mother-child relationship); id. § 8-201(b)(6) (stating the requirements for the
establishment of a father-child relationship); id. § 8-201(c) (listing the three factors to attain “de
facto parent status”). De facto parents are on equal footing with biological or adoptive parents. See,
e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 931 (Del. 2011) (holding that the de facto parent’s parentage
interest does not infringe on the legal parent’s due process rights). But see In re Bancroft, 19 A.3d
730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (finding the statute overbroad and violative of fit mother’s and
father’s due process rights when the mother’s boyfriend seeks to be a third parent); K.A.F. v.
D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975, 980 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) (holding that a former female domestic
partner of birth mother has standing to seek childcare order where birth mother ceded some of her
parental authority, but where adoptive parent had not, upon showing “exceptional circumstances”).
138. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.440(4) (2020) (directing preponderance of evidence
standard).
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to, nor formal adopters of, children. Thus the Maine Parentage Act,
effective in July 2016, provides for presumed parents who resided since
birth with a child for at least two years and “assumed personal, financial,
or custodial responsibilities,”139 as well as for de facto parents who, inter
alia, resided with the child “for a significant period of time,” established
with the child “a bonded and dependent relationship,” and “accepted full
and permanent responsibilities as a parent . . . without expectation of
financial compensation.”140 Similarly, there are both residency/hold out
and de facto parents in Delaware,141 Washington,142 and Vermont.143
Comparably, there may be spousal and de facto parentage in a single
state. Further, there are reasons for establishing both parentage forms in
a single person. In Vermont, an adjudication of de facto parentage “does
not disestablish the parentage of any other parent.”144 Such an
adjudicatory proceeding may include judicial consideration of “a claim
to parentage of the child” by another,145 though there is not explicit
requirement that those with competing claims to parentage be noticed.146
So, a birth mother’s husband who is not the biological father of the child
born of sex might seek de facto parent status, to accompany his presumed
marital parent status, in order to lessen—if not eliminate—any childcare
parent initiative by the birth mother’s former residential, intimate partner
who also childcared for a while, as a VAP is often more difficult to
overcome than is a spousal parent presumption.147
139. ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1881(3) (2019).
140. Id. § 1891(3).
141. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5) (2019) (listing requirements for a presumed
residency/hold out parent); id. § 8-201(c) (enumerating requirements for a de facto parent).
142. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.115(b) (2020) (requiring a presumed residency/hold out
parent “for the first four years” of the child’s life); id. § 26.26A.440 (defining a de facto parent).
143. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 15C, § 401(a)(1) (2020) (presuming residency/hold out parent after the
first two years); id. § 501(a) (describing the de facto parent).
144. Id. § 501(c).
145. Id. §§ 206, 501(b) (listing guidelines for “adjudicating competing claims of parentage”).
146. Id. § 502(a) (requiring that petitions are served on “all parents and legal guardians of the
child”). But see id. § 502(b) (stating that an “adverse party,” presumably including an intervener,
may file a response to a petition).
147. Post-sixty-day challenges to VAPs, but not to spousal parentage, at least by VAP
signatories must be grounded on fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact as well as on the lack of
biological ties. Parness & Saxe, Reforming VAPs, supra note 82, at 194–96. Spousal parentage
sometimes can be challenged solely due to lack of biological ties. See, e.g., In re Waites, 152 So.
3d 306, 307 (Miss. 2014) (reversing the appellate court and excluding the spousal parent when it
was found that the spousal parent was not the natural parent of the child). Biological ties are less
important when state public policies more strictly view spousal parent rights and responsibilities,
as attributes necessarily arising from marriages alone, as per Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015), as in McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492, 495–96 (Ariz. 2017) (holding that spousal
parentage not dependent upon presumptive biological ties), or when state public policies more
significantly promote the best interests of children (especially as to two parent support), and as in
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F. Nonsurrogacy Assisted Reproduction Parentage
The 1973 UPA does not deal with the “many complex and serious
problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination.”148 It does,
however, address “one fact situation that occurs frequently,”149 a
“consent” by a husband to the artificial insemination of his wife with
“semen donated by a man not her husband.” Here, the husband is to be
“treated in law as if he were the natural father” where the consent was in
writing and “signed by him and his wife,” with certification undertaken
and then filed by the supervising “licensed physician” with state
governmental officials.150 The semen donor who is not the husband is to
“be treated in law as if he were not the natural father.”151
In response to the increasing numbers of children born of assisted
reproduction, the 2017 UPA contains distinct articles on nonsurrogacy
and surrogacy births. In nonsurrogacy settings, the 2017 UPA “is
substantially similar” to the 2000 UPA, with the “primary changes . . .
intended to update the article so that it applies equally to same-sex
couples.”152 The 2017 UPA thus recognizes that a donor, in the absence
of common residence in the first two years while holding out a child as
one’s own, “is not a parent of a child conceived by assisted
reproduction.”153 A consent to parentage must be signed by the birth
mother and “an individual who intends to be a parent,” though the
“record” need not be certified by a physician.154 The lack of such a
consent does not foreclose childcare parentage for an intended parent
where there is found clear-and-convincing evidence of an “express
agreement” between the individual and the birth mother “entered before
conception.”155 As well, the lack of such consent does not foreclose an
individual’s parentage where the child was held out as the individual’s
own in the child’s first two years.156 The nonparental status of one
married to a birth mother of a child born by assisted reproduction, even
LC v. MG & Child Support Enforcement Agency, 430 P.3d 400, 424–25 (Haw. 2018) (disallowing
female spouse to rebut marital parentage due to spouse’s failure to consent to assisted reproduction
involving her wife since the child’s best interests require “a child have two parents to provide
financial benefits”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 234 (2019).
148. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 5(a) (stating that all papers and records pertaining to the insemination are to be kept
confidential, though subject to inspection pursuant to a court order “for good cause shown”).
151. Id. § 5(b).
152. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 701 preceding cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
153. Id. §§ 702–704.
154. Id. § 704(a).
155. Id. § 704(b)(1). It is clear why an “express agreement” undertaken post-conception does
not prompt comparable childcare parentage. Here, there is much greater certainty that a child will
be born so that an agreement is far less speculative.
156. Id. § 704(b)(2).
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if a gamete donor, may be established by a showing of a lack of consent
and by not holding out of the child as one’s own.157
The nonsurrogacy parentage norms in the UPAs are now reflected in
some state statutes,158 and in precedents untethered to statutes,159 with
significant interstate variations.160 The 2017 UPA provisions have been
enacted in a few states.161
Childcare parentage for birth mothers and intended parents in
nonsurrogacy assisted reproduction settings often involve express
consents. There could be, but there generally are no, state-required forms
guiding such consents. In California, however, in nonsurrogacy settings
there are statutorily-recommended consent forms that may be used but
are not required.162 Regardless of the nonsurrogacy parentage norms,
state-formulated consent forms should be contemplated as informed
consent would be better assured and there would be greater certainty

157. Id. § 705.
158. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.7031 (West 2019) (stating that fatherhood for
unwed man, intending to be father, who provides sperm to licensed physician and consents to the
use of that sperm for assisted reproduction by an unwed woman, where consent is in a record signed
by man and woman and kept by the physician); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C:30(I)(b) (2020)
(stating that unwed mother has sperm donor “identified on birth record” where “an affidavit of
paternity” has been executed); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-704(a) (2020) (“Consent by a woman
and a man who intends to be a parent of a child born to the woman by assisted reproduction must
be in a record signed by the woman and the man.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-904(a) (2020)
(resembling Delaware’s statute); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-703 (2020) (“A person who provides
eggs, sperm, or embryos for or consents to assisted reproduction as provided in Section 7-704 of
the New Mexico Uniform Parentage Act with the intent to be the parent of a child is a parent of the
resulting child.”).
159. See, e.g., Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that, to avoid
constitutional infirmity, assisted reproduction statute as written solely for married opposite sex
couple applied to same sex domestic partners); Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2014) (opining that, though the statute (both pre- and post-2011) indicated explicitly a
lack of paternity for this particular semen donor when his unwed partner delivered a child conceived
via assisted reproduction, the statute on presumed parentage for one (either male or female) who
receives a child into the home and openly holds out the child as one’s own natural child can
support—in certain circumstances—legal paternity for the semen donor); Ramey v. Sutton, 362
P.3d 217 (Okla. 2015) (unwritten preconception agreement prompts in loco parentis childcare
status for former lesbian partner of birth mother, though she contributed no genetic material); In re
Brooke S.B., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016) (agreement between lesbian partners can prompt
parentage in non-birth mother).
160. See generally Deborah H. Forman, Exploring the Boundaries of Families Created with
Known Sperm Donors: Who’s In and Who’s Out?, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 41 (2016).
161. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 701–708 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017) (suggesting assisted
reproduction statutes involving no surrogates which are followed in WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.26A.610 (2020) and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 701 (2020)).
162. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5(d) (2020) (forming an assisted reproduction pacts by two
married or by two unmarried people, where signatories may or may not have used their own genetic
material to prompt a pregnancy).
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regarding party intentions. Such forms would be comparable to the
generally required forms for VAPs.163
G. Surrogacy Assisted Reproduction Parentage
As to surrogacy, the 1973 UPA is silent.164 The 2017 UPA, like the
2000 UPA, distinguishes between genetic (“traditional”) and gestational
surrogacy.165 Unlike its 2000 predecessor, the 2017 UPA does not require
all agreements to be validated by a court order prior to any medical
procedures.166 The 2017 UPA imposes differing requirements for the two
surrogacy forms, with “additional safeguards or requirements on genetic
surrogacy agreements,”167 as only they involve a woman giving birth
while “using her own gamete.”168 The 2017 UPA recognizes there can be
“one or more intended parents”169 in surrogacy settings. The common
requirements include signatures in a record, “attested by a notarial officer
or witnesses;” independent legal counsel for all signatories; and
execution before implantation.170 Special provisions for gestational
surrogacy pacts include opportunity for “party” termination “before an
embryo transfer” and opportunity for a prebirth court order declaring
parentage vesting at birth.171 Special provisions for genetic surrogacy
pacts include the general requirement that “to be enforceable,” an
agreement must be judicially validated “before assisted reproduction”
upon a finding that “all parties entered into the agreement voluntarily”
163. See Parness & Townsend, For Those Not John Edwards, supra note 74, at 63–87
(reviewing similarities and differences in state-generated VAP forms). At times, some written
parentage acknowledgments operate though state-generated forms were not utilized. See, e.g., D.C.
CODE § 16-909(a)(4) (2020) (presuming that a man is the father of a child if he “has acknowledged
paternity in writing”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-204(A)(4)(c) (2020) (presuming a man to be the
father of a child that “he promised in a record to support . . . as his own” if he married the birth
mother after the child’s birth); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(a)(4) (2020) (presuming a man to be
the father of a child if he “notoriously or in writing recognizes paternity of the child,” including but
not limited to acts in accordance with the voluntary acknowledgement statutes).
164. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973) (addressing husband-wife
pacts on assisted reproduction where the wife bears the child and intends to parent, the Act “does
not deal with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the practice of artificial
insemination”).
165. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. VIII cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
166. Id. §§ 801–802.
167. Id. art. VIII cmt; see, e.g., id. §§ 803–807 (stating the common safeguards or requirements
for all surrogacy pacts). See also id. §§ 808–812 (stating special requirements for gestational
surrogacy agreements); id. §§ 813–818 (stating special requirements for genetic surrogacy
agreements).
168. Id. § 801(1); see id. § 801(2) (stating gestational surrogacy covers births to a woman who
uses “gametes that are not her own.”); id. §§ 808–812 (providing the special rules for gestational
surrogacy pacts); id. §§ 813–818 (providing the special rules for genetic surrogacy pacts).
169. Id. § 801(3).
170. Id. § 803(6)–(7), (9).
171. Id. §§ 808(a), 811(a).
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and understood its terms;172 that a genetic surrogate may withdraw
consent “in a record” at any time before seventy-two hours after the
birth;173 and that a genetic surrogate cannot be ordered by a court to “be
impregnated, terminate or not terminate a pregnancy, or submit to
medical procedures.”174
Significant constitutional issues under these UPA provisions await
rulings. For example, under Lehr, might both a gametes donor and a
gestational surrogate be biological parents? Further, are the parental
opportunity interests of gestational surrogates ever waivable prebirth, or
preconception, or preimplantation? And, might the right to terminate a
pregnancy, or especially to refuse or to secure certain nonlife threatening
medical procedures, ever be subject to contractual limitations?
UPA surrogacy parentage norms are now reflected both in state
statutes175 and precedents untethered to statutes.176 Certain provisions of
the 2017 UPA have been enacted in a few states.177 Elsewhere, major
sections of the 2000 UPA on surrogacy operate.178 There are no major
state required forms as with VAPs. Few suggested forms have yet
172. Id. § 813.
173. Id. § 814(a)(2).
174. Id. § 818(b).
175. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(I) (2020) (stating before insemination pursuant to
a surrogacy contract that must be deemed “lawful”); see also id. § 168-B:21(I) (stating a court
“shall” be petitioned for “judicial preauthorization”); id. § 168-B:12(I) (requiring that “[a]ny of the
parties to a gestational carrier agreement may petition the court for a parentage order declaring that
the intended parent or parents are the sole parents of a child resulting from assisted reproduction
and a gestational carrier arrangement, and that the gestational carrier and her spouse or partner, if
any, are not the parent or parents of such a child” and mandating that the court “within 30 days,
grant the petition upon a finding that the parties have substantially complied with the requirements
of this chapter”).
176. See In re F.T.R, 833 N.W.2d 634, 653 (Wis. 2013) (enforcing surrogacy pact between two
couples as long as child’s best interests were served, while urging the legislature to “consider
enacting legislation regarding surrogacy” to insure “the courts and the parties understand the
expectations and limitations under Wisconsin law”); see also In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 833
(Tenn. 2014) (holding “traditional surrogacy contracts do not violate public policy as a general
rule” where surrogate artificially inseminated with sperm of intended father, who was not married
to intended mother); In re Amadi A., No. W2014–01281–COA–R3–JV, 2015 WL 1956247 (Tenn.
App. Apr. 24, 2015) (holding a gestational surrogate for married couple is placed on birth
certificate, as said to be required by statute where intended father’s/husband’s sperm used with egg
from unknown donor and intended mother/wife was recognized by all parties as legal mother and
reiterating the plea from In re Baby that the legislature should enact a comprehensive statutory
scheme); Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783, 786–87 (Conn. 2011) (holding biological father’s male
domestic partner can also be intended parent of a child born to a gestational surrogate); In re John,
174 A.D.3d 89, 99–101 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019) (holding that enforcing a surrogacy pact in the
absence of statute, an intended parent (also the sperm donor) who employed a gestational surrogate
was allowed in one case to formally adopt his genetic offspring).
177. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.A.715 (2020) (discussing gestational or genetic
surrogacy agreement); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 801 (2020) (discussing gestational carrier
agreements).
178. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. 78B-15-801 (2019) (similar to 2000 UPA).
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appeared. But there are suggested forms for nonsuroggacy assisted
reproduction births in California.179 The increased use of required forms,
and the increased availability of suggested forms, would diminish
significantly individual case disputes over consents to parentage or
nonparentage.
H. Nonparental Childcare
The 2018 UNCVA, as with the 2017 UPA, addresses the effects of the
changing ways in which US families are formed and reformed. Unlike
the UPA, the UNCVA generally speaks to childcare opportunities for
nonparents over the objections of parents. The above-described Troxel
precedent guided the NCCUSL norms on nonparental childcare, though
the NCCUSL recognized there are some continuing uncertainties
regarding the breadth of that precedent.180
The 2018 UNCVA recognizes two forms of nonparents who may
secure court-ordered childcare over parental objections. The forms
encompasses nonparents who are “consistent” caretakers and nonparents
who have “substantial” relationships with the children so that denial of
custody or visitation would result in “harm” to the children.181 Consistent
caretakers must demonstrate some of the circumstances that govern de
facto parentage, including having “established a bond and dependent
relationship,”182 or residency/hold out parentage, including living with
the child.183 Nonparents claiming “substantial” relationships must
demonstrate “a familial relationship with the child by blood or law” or a
relationship “without expectation of compensation,”184 as well as that “a
significant emotional bond exists between the nonparent and the
child.”185
The 2018 UNCVA defines a nonparent as “an individual other than the
parent of the child,” who can be, but need not be, “a grandparent, sibling,

179. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5 (2020).
180. See, e.g., UNIF. NONPARENT CUSTODY & VISITATION ACT § 4 cmt. 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2018) (noting in Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000)
(O’Connor, J., plurality opinion), the Court recognized the current precedent did not consider
“whether the Due Process clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of
harm or potential harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation”).
181. Id. § 4 (a)(1). These nonparents must also establish the best interests of children will be
served by any childcare orders. Id. § 4(a)(2).
182. Id. § 4(b)(4).
183. Id. § 4(b)(1).
184. Id. § 4(c)(1)(A)–(B).
185. Id. § 4(c)(2).
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or stepparent of the child.”186 A child under the Act is “an unemancipated
individual” under eighteen years of age.187
IV. CURRENT ILLINOIS CHILDCARE PARENTAGE LAWS
A. Introduction
In Illinois there are several statutes on childcare parentage, including
statutes in and outside of the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
(IMDMA) and the Parentage Act. Some laws are relatively new. The
Family Law Study Committee (FLCS), a 2008 directive of the Illinois
General Assembly, proposed statutory reforms on childcare parentage for
children born of sex and of assisted reproduction, with many of its
proposed reforms enacted.188 But with all the statutory amendments,
current Illinois laws poorly address many of the questions raised by the
changes in reproductive technologies and family relationships. The FLCS
did its work before the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act and the 2018
Uniform Nonparent Custody and Visitation Act were adopted, as well as
before the 2019 Draft ALI Restatement on Children and the Law.
The FLCS proposals appeared in two bills. In significant part, one
sought to replace the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 while the other sought
to amend the IMDMA. Each bill extended somewhat parental childcare
interests to those who were neither actual or alleged biological parents
nor adoptive parents.189
Common law rulings outside of statutory interpretation could, both
before and after the work of the FLCS and General Assembly follow-up,
extend childcare parentage to those outside statutes. Common law
childcare parents who were similar to statutory childcare parents, in fact,
have been recognized for certain assisted reproduction births. The former
Illinois Parentage Act guided births to wives where licensed physician
supervision was used and where written consents were needed where the
husbands were not the semen donors. Precedents recognize other nonbirth
spouses and other persons as parents in assisted reproduction settings.190
186. Id. § 2(7).
187. Id. § 2(1).
188. See André Katz & Erin Bodendorfer, The New and Improved Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act, 103 ILL. B.J., Nov. 2015, at 30 (discussing the substantial revisions
made to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act); Margaret A. Bennett, An Overview of the
Illinois Parentage Act of 2015, 103 ILL. B.J., Dec. 2015, at 28 (discussing the Illinois Parentage Act
of 2015 and how it reflects changes in cultural now, as well as reproductive technology).
189. See Adam W. Lasker, Is A Family-Law Overhaul On the Way?, 100 ILL. B.J., Sept. 2012,
at 458. See also Lisa K. Murphy, House Bill 1452: The Future of Family Law in Illinois?, 26
DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N BRIEF, June 2014, at 28.
190. See In re T.P.S., 2013 IL App (5th) 120438-U, ¶ 46 (discussing the former same sex partner
has her guardianship continued for a child born of assisted reproduction where birth mother then
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Thus parentage has been recognized in an unmarried couple employing
assisted reproduction without physician supervision where one of the two
delivers a child planned to be parented by the couple.191 As well, a joint
parenting agreement, a part of a marriage dissolution case settlement,
between a birth mother and a former stepfather has been enforced though
the former husband would have had no standing to pursue court-ordered
childcare without the agreement.192
Yet common law precedents on childcare parentage have not spoken
to all circumstances where technologies are employed in human
conception, as with genetic surrogacy. And they have not addressed
childcare parentage issues for children born of consensual sex in some
circumstances where there are no statutory norms.193 The Illinois
Supreme Court has chosen, on separation of power grounds, to defer to
the General Assembly in many circumstances.194
B. Spousal Parentage
State-recognized partners of birth mothers when their children are born
are “presumed” parents.195 Such parentage continues for these persons
until “rebutted or confirmed in a judicial or administrative
proceeding.”196 Similar parentage arises and continues for those whose
partnerships were “terminated” no more than three hundred days before
the births.197 Further, such parentage arises and continues for those who
“attempted” to establish similar partnerships.198
objected, but had earlier entered into the guardianship with the expectation to raise the child “as a
couple”).
191. See In re M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. 2003) (recognizing parentage in an anonymous
sperm donor).
192. Compare In re Schlam, 648 N.E.3d 345, 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding a joint parenting
agreement was valid and noted the rights of the child were not bargained away), with In re
Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d 799, 806 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (no visitation pact between father and former
stepmother, only a “gratuitous undertaking”).
193. See, e.g., In re A.B., 2015 IL App (5th) 140581-U, ¶ 19 (rejecting man’s request, via claims
for common law contract involving promissory estoppel, fraud and equitable estoppel, for visitation
with child fathered by another through sex where man supported and reared the child from birth
and for eighteen months).
194. See In re Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 795 (Ill. 2015) (“Legal change in this complex
area must be the product of a policy debate.”).
195. A partnership recognition arises through “a marriage, civil union, or substantially similar
legal relationship,” like a domestic partnership. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/204(a)(1) (2020). Earlier
presumed spousal parent statutes operated only for male partners, though equality principles could
have operated to extend the presumption to female partners of birth mothers, at least where assisted
reproduction was employed with donated sperm. Henderson v. Adams, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1076
(S.D. Ind. 2016), aff’d in part and vacated in part, Henderson v. Box, 947 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2020).
196. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/103(p) (2020). See, e.g., Sparks v. Sparks, 122 N.E.3d 715 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2018) (discussing spousal parentage rebuttal).
197. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/204(a)(2) (2020).
198. Id. § 204(a)(3).
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C. Voluntary Acknowledgment Parentage
Voluntary acknowledgment parentage arises when a birth mother and
a “man seeking to establish his parentage” execute an acknowledgment
on a form complying with statutory prerequisites, including that there be
a witnessed “record;” “an authentication under penalty of perjury;” and
an articulation of the limited availability of “a challenge by a
signatory.”199 Such an acknowledgment is the equivalent of a judicial
adjudication of parentage of the child.200 Such an acknowledgment may
be undertaken by a man where another is a presumed parent as long as
the presumed parent, usually the spouse or otherwise the state-recognized
partner of the birth mother,201 signs a “denial of parentage.”202
D. Residency/Hold Out Parentage
As noted, the UPAs have presented two somewhat different norms for
establishing childcare parentage involving both residence with the child
and holding that child out as one’s own. The variations chiefly involve
whether residency/hold out begins at birth and how long it lasts.
Currently, Illinois statutes recognize no comparable form of childcare
parentage, though this form was proposed for enactment in the General
Assembly when the 2015 parentage law amendments were considered.203
The Illinois Supreme Court has chosen not to develop common law
parentage tracking residency/hold out parentage in the UPAs in deference
to General Assembly authority.204
E. De Facto Parentage
As noted, both the 2017 UPA and ALI pronouncements recognize
forms of de facto parentage. These forms can arise not only with
residence and hold out, but also with, inter alia, the establishment of a
bonded and dependent, parental-like relationship with no expectation of
financial benefit. Currently, Illinois statutes recognize no comparable
avenue to childcare parentage. The Illinois Supreme Court has chosen
here as well not to develop common law parentage tracking de facto

199. Id. § 302(a)(1), (2), (4)–(5).
200. Id. § 302(a)(5).
201. Id. § 204(a).
202. Id. § 303.
203. See, e.g., Parentage Act of 2013 § 204(a)(5), (b)(5), H.B. 1243, 98th Sess., Gen. Assemb.
(Ill. 2013) (describing situations where men and women will be presumed to be the parent of a
child).
204. See, e.g., In re Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 795 (Ill. 2015) (concluding that custody and
visitation issues are a “complex area” requiring “policy debate” in the legislature). On state court
judicial deference to General Assembly authority regarding childcare parentage, see Parness, More
Principled Allocations, supra note 11, at 480.
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parentage in deference to General Assembly authority,205 which had a
comparable parentage proposal before it when considering recent
parentage law reforms.206
F. Nonsurrogacy Assisted Reproduction Parentage
Childcare parentage in Illinois arising from birth by nonsurrogacy
assisted reproduction had been significantly governed by the Illinois
Parentage Act.207 That act guided births to wives where there was
required licensed physician supervision and there were written consents
by husbands, acknowledged by their wives, in settings where the
husbands were not the semen donors.208 Written consents and physician
assistance were not mandated for parentage to arise where the semen
donors were the husbands.209
Now, childcare parentage arising from nonsurrogacy assisted
reproduction is significantly guided by the Illinois Parentage Act of 2015,
effective in 2017.210 It extends recognition of assisted reproduction
parentage to the both wed and unwed,211 as it covers “any individual who
is an intended parent” as defined by the Act.212 In particular, the Act
generally recognizes that a donor of genetic material used to conceive a
child by means of assisted reproduction presumptively “is not a parent”
of the child,213 but may become a parent by establishing intended
parentage.214 The Act allows prebirth as well as postbirth judicial
205. See, e.g., Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d at 795 (concluding that custody and visitation issues
are a “complex area” requiring “policy debate” in the legislature). There is some hint that there
could develop either residency/hold out or de facto parentage under common law principles in
“egregious” cases. See, e.g., In re A.B., 2015 IL App (5th) 140581-U, ¶¶ 16–18 (citing Koelle v.
Zwiren, 672 N.E.2d 868 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)) (detailing how “deceptive means” were employed by
a birth mother to prompt childcare by a nonparent for over eight years).
206. See, e.g., H.B. 1452, 98th Sess., Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013) (providing an “equitable”
parenthood provision).
207. The old version of the Illinois Parentage Act was enacted in 1984. See 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT 45/1–28 (1984); P.A. 083-1026 (eff. Jan. 5, 1984); P.A. 086-1475 (eff. Jan. 10, 1991). The
Illinois Legislature revised the Parentage Act in 2017. P.A. 099-0085, § 977 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016);
P.A. 099-0763, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017).
208. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(a) (2016) (repealed 2017).
209. Id. § 2.
210. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/701 (2020).
211. It also extends assisted reproduction parentage to certain gametes donors who were
intended parents, but who died before insemination or embryo transfer. Id. § 705.
212. Id. § 703(a). Intended parent under the Act “means a person who enters into an assisted
reproductive technology arrangement, including a gestational surrogacy arrangement, under which
he or she will be the legal parent of the resulting child.” Id. § 103(m-5).
213. Id. § 702.
214. Id. § 703(a) (providing for an “agreement . . . entered into prior to any insemination or
embryo transfer” involving both donor who is relinquishing rights and intended parent). See also
id. § 703(b) (stating that an anonymous gamete donor, without a designated intended parent at time
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confirmation of “the existence of a parent-child relationship” based on
compliance with intended parentage norms.215 Further, the Act generally
allows withdrawals of consent to use donated genetic material and to
future parenthood if asserted before significant steps toward conception
are taken.216
Importantly, where the requirements of the Act on “intended”
parentage are not met or are inapplicable, and parentage disputes arise,
“a court . . . shall determine parentage based on evidence of the parties’
intent at the time of donation.”217 Explicit requirements of the Act
regarding donor relinquishment of “all rights and responsibilities to any
resulting child” are not met where there is no “written legal agreement”
entered after consultation with “independent counsel.”218 Explicit
requirements of the Act regarding intended parentage are also not met
where an agreement is not “entered into prior to any insemination or
embryo transfer.”219
The provisions of the Act on intended parentage for donors and
nondonors alike in assisted reproduction births are inapplicable to
children born as a result of “a valid gestational surrogacy arrangement
meeting the requirements of the Gestational Surrogacy Act.”220
Seemingly, the Act invites judicial parentage determinations through
common law rulings when children are born of assisted reproduction in
contemplated surrogacy settings where there were no “valid” agreements
under the Gestational Surrogacy Act.221
G. Surrogacy Assisted Reproduction Parentage
Parentage via birth by assisted reproduction with the use of a surrogate
is governed by the 2005 Gestational Surrogacy Act.222 This Act guides
reproductive contracts between a gestational surrogate223 and an intended
of donation, is not a parent if “parental rights” were “relinquished . . . in writing at the time of
donation” and intended parent is “the parent of any resulting child”).
215. Id. § 703(c).
216. See id. § 704 (preventing intended parentage in another where “donor withdraws consent
to his or her donation prior to the insemination or the combination of gametes.”). Burden of proof
is “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 707; see also id. § 704 (preventing intended parentage for
one who withdraws consent “prior to insemination or embryo transfer”). The burden of proof is
“clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 707.
217. Id. § 703(d).
218. Id. § 703(a).
219. Id.
220. Id. § 701.
221. Id. § 703(d).
222. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1–75 (2020).
223. A gestational surrogate is defined under the Parentage Act of 2015 as “a woman who is
not an intended parent and agrees to engage in a gestational arrangement pursuant to the terms of a
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parent or two intended parents.224 Importantly, there is no recognition of
possible genetic surrogacy as the Act defines a surrogate as one who “has
made no genetic contribution.”225 Contracts under the Act must have
involved at least one intended parent who contributes “one of the gametes
resulting in a pre-embryo that the gestational surrogate will attempt to
carry to term,”226 as well as a “medical need for the gestational
surrogacy” by at least by one intended parent.227 A parent-child
relationship could be established prebirth for a child to be born to a
gestational surrogate where there is either an intended parent or intended
parents.228
Clearly, certain surrogacy arrangements are outside the express terms
of the Act. What if a surrogate is impregnated with a turkey baster? What
if a single intended parent has no medical need?
H. Nonparent Childcare
By comparison to the 2018 UNCVA229 and many current state laws
outside of Illinois,230 Illinois statutes provide fewer opportunities for
nonparents to seek court-ordered childcare over the current objections of
any existing legal parent.231 “Visitation”232 orders must only issue if a
parent has voluntarily and indefinitely relinquished physical custody233
and “if there is an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent and the
denial has caused the child undue mental, physical or emotional harm.”234
Standing to seek such orders is limited to “appropriate” persons,235
identified as including only “grandparents, great-grandparents, step-

valid gestational surrogacy arrangement under the Gestational Surrogacy Act.” 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 46/103(m) (2020).
224. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/15(b)(3) (2020). Seemingly the Act contemplates only an
intended mother, an intended father, or both. Id. § 15(b)(1)–(2).
225. Id. § 10.
226. Id. § 20(b)(1).
227. Id. § 20(b)(2).
228. Id. § 35(a).
229. See UNIF. NONPARENT CUSTODY & VISITATION ACT § 4(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2018) (stating nonparent childcare standing extends to “consistent” caretakers and those with
“substantial” relationships with children).
230. See Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third Parties to Seek
Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1 (2013).
231. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.9 (2020).
232. Id. § 602.9(b)(3). Seemingly, visitation orders include orders involving “visitation and
electronic communication.” Id. § 602.9(a)(4).
233. Id. § 601.2(b)(3), employed by In re K.N.L., 131 N.E.3d 130, 134 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
234. Id. § 602.9(b)(3); see also id. § 602.9(c)(1), (b)(4) (“[A nonparent must] prove that the
parent’s actions and decisions regarding visitation will cause undue harm to the child’s mental,
physical or emotional health”).
235. Id. § 602.9(b)(1).
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parents and siblings.”236 Those with standing must establish that the
“minor child is one year or older” and that one of the following conditions
is also met: a nonobjecting parent is “deceased or has been missing for at
least 90 days;” “a parent of the child is incompetent as a matter of law;”
a parent has been in jail or prison for over ninety days; a parent, separated
or divorced from another parent, does not object, but only where any
visitation would not diminish “the parenting time” of the parent who is
“not related to” the petitioning nonparent; or, the child was born to unwed
parents who do not now live together.237 An independent avenue to
nonparent childcare is available through the Illinois Probate Act’s
provisions on guardianship appointments.238
As with the 2018 UNCVA, Illinois statutes do not address directly
nonparent childcare in the form of child support obligations for
nonparents arising from their earlier parental-like, or other, acts.239
V. CONTEMPLATING NEW ILLINOIS CHILDCARE PARENTAGE LAWS
Notwithstanding recent statutory enactments and a few common law
precedents on childcare parentage, there is a pressing need, given changes
in reproductive technologies and in human conduct, for Illinois
lawmakers, especially General Assembly members, to consider further
changes. They should focus on whether, and if so how far, to extend
childcare interests and responsibilities arising at, or soon after, or long
after birth, to those who are neither actual nor alleged biological parents
or adoptive parents. Statutes and precedents already recognize some such
interests and responsibilities, as with the precedents involving women
whose partners bear children via assisted reproduction where the couple
had earlier agreed to raise any children jointly. In considering further
extensions of childcare rights and duties to those without biological or
adoptive ties, Illinois lawmakers necessarily must confront several
important issues. Some of those issues follow.
A. Three or More Childcare Parents
One issue raising several policy questions involves the circumstances
under which three or more people might be deemed parents (of perhaps
different forms) imbued with standing to seek “parenting time.” Two
236. Id. § 602.9(c)(1). For definitions of these persons, see id. § 602.9(a). See also Sharpe v.
Westmoreland, 126 N.E.3d 690 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019) (holding that step-parent includes only those
married, and not those in civil unions).
237. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.9(c)(1)(A)–(E) (2020).
238. See, e.g., Henry Kass, The Illinois Probate Act: A Non-Parent’s Alternative to the IMDMA
for Allocation of Parental Responsibilities, 31 J. DUPAGE COUNTY B. ASS’N, Apr. 2019, at 8.
239. For current state laws on the child support obligations of nonparents, see, e.g., Jeffrey A.
Parness & Matthew Timko, De Facto Parent and Nonparent Child Support Orders, 67 AM. U. L.
REV. 769, 780–86 (2018) [hereinafter Parness & Timko, Child Support].
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General Assembly proposals at one time offered conflicting answers.
Presumed parentage before the recent Parentage Act amendments meant
a rebuttable presumption about male parentage, wherein only one man
seemingly could be a father at any particular time. Under the Illinois
Parentage Act of 1984, a husband’s presumed parentage arising from
marriage could be rebutted with proof of no genetic ties,240 with similar
proof also available to challenge a paternity acknowledgment involving
alleged genetic ties that had prompted a comparable presumed parentage
in an unwed father.241 A proposed Parentage Act provision called for a
judicial choice of one or another presumed parent who will rear a child
with the birth mother, with the choice guided by logic and public policy,
especially the child’s best interests.242 Under this approach, there could
initially be two presumed fathers—though only one could remain a parent
along with the birth mother. But a proposed Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act provision allowed for three or more parents, as it had no
provision on a mandated judicial choice between two competing
equitable parents who existed simultaneously alongside a birth mother.243
In Louisiana, the high court has recognized, via its common
lawmaking authority, that three different parents may child rear per court
order.244 And in California, the possibility of three childcare parents is
recognized by statute.245
If at all, under what circumstances might three (or more) people in
Illinois simultaneously share parenting time? Should three (or more)
parents be possible only in certain instances, as when parenting time
allocations are based on preconception acts, like assisted reproduction
pacts or preadoption pacts that were judicially recognized preconception
or preadoption? Should three (or more) custodial parents be possible only
where there are present or former stepparents (i.e., now or once married
to one of two childcare parents)? Recognition of three parents under any
240. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(1)–(2) (2020) (noting spousal parentage for man, “presumed
to be the natural father of a child”); id. § 7(b)–(b-5) (showing that after rebuttal of spousal parentage
arises under 45(a)(1) or (2) through “DNA tests,” the “paternity of the child by another man may
be determined”).
241. Id. § 5(a)(3)–(4) (showing parentage for a man, “presumed to be the natural father of a
child,” who “signed an acknowledgement of parentage”); id. § 6(d) (“a signed acknowledgment of
paternity . . . may be challenged in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of
fact”); id. § 7(a) (saying a man “alleging himself to be the father of the child” can pursue an action
“to determine the existence of a father and child relationship” even where such “a relationship” is
already presumed in another man under 45/5(a)).
242. Illinois Parentage Act of 2013 § 204(c), H.B. 1243, 98th Sess., Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013).
243. H.B. 1452 § 600, 98th Sess., Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2013).
244. See, e.g., Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989); T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873 (La.
1999).
245. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (2020) (providing that a court may find “more than two persons
with a claim to parentage . . . if recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child”).
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circumstances should always serve a child’s best interests, perhaps as
well serving to prevent harm or detriment to the child.
B. Expanded Visitation Interests for Nonparents
A second issue involves whether certain family members, or others,
should be accorded greater standing to seek court orders at least for
“parenting time,” visitation, or continuing child contact (e.g., Skype or
iPhone facetimes), if not an allocation of parental decisionmaking, even
if they are not recognized as parents.246 If so, should any such orders be
limited to those nonparents with intimate, or perhaps only state
recognized marital or marital-like, relationships with existing legal
parents? Further, should detriment to the child be required before a
nonparent can be afforded such standing? And, should a showing of a
parent’s lack of physical custody be a prerequisite to nonparent standing,
especially where detriment/harm to the child will arise without an order
involving some form of continuing contact?
Beyond stepparents and the like, should grandparents who rear, or help
to rear, their grandchildren under agreements with their grandchildren’s
parent or parents ever be able to attain nonparental childcare interests
over the current objections of existing legal parents or an existing legal
parent? If so, how should the standards for grandparents and stepparents
(present, and perhaps former) be distinguished, if at all? For example,
should grandparents, still part of a family that includes existing legal
parents and their children, be accorded less standing to seek nonparental
childcare orders than former stepparents, who are no longer within the
traditionally-viewed families of the parents and their children, but who
acted as parents for some time? Further, should standing to pursue
nonparent childcare be extended beyond “grandparents, greatgrandparents, step-parents and siblings,” recognized as “appropriate”
persons under the current nonparent childcare statute?247
Finally, should standing to pursue nonparent childcare ever be
recognized pursuant to contract? In one case, the Illinois Appellate Court
determined that it could not validate a preadoption contract by the
maternal grandparents, who became parents, to allow “regular visitation,
communication and contact” with the adopted child by the biological
father and the paternal grandparents because such an arrangement was

246. The current Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act differentiates between
childcare orders on decision-making and on parenting time when allocating parental
responsibilities. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.5 (2020); id. § 602.7.
247. Id. § 602.9(c)(1). See, e.g., In re R.W., 99 N.E.3d 222, 224–25, 232, 239 (Ill. App. Ct.
2018) (showing that parenting time was allocated to the birth mother, unwed biological father,
maternal uncle, and an “unrelated individual” who was given decision-making authority).
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foreclosed by the adoption statutes.248 In the case, there was no
consideration of the particular child’s best interests, and no analysis of
how the ruling would later negatively impact adoption opportunities that
would serve the best interests of other children. Further, even if contracts
regarding future nonparent childcare are not recognized, should estoppel
principles sometimes bar parental veto of future nonparent childcare
where the parent earlier allowed (or requested) significant nonparent care
leading to significant interpersonal relationships, especially where the
lack of such future care will likely cause detriment to the child?
The standards under the 2018 UNCVA do not distinguish between
(blood-related or nonblood-related) grandparents, stepparents, siblings,
and others who may seek nonparental childcare orders over the objections
of existing parents.249 But in several states, as now in Illinois,250 there are
special nonparental childcare standing norms for grandparents,
stepparents and others (like siblings), where other nonparents may also
have standing, but with different norms.251 To date, there are no
significant constitutional precedents on differentiating between
nonparents. But one can imagine that differences between those who are
and who are not blood-related might be deemed important, as biology
was important in Lehr, or that differences between those who are in and
outside of stable family units might be deemed important, as marriage
was important in Michael H.
C. Residency/Hold Out Parentage
A third issue involves whether there should be presumed childcare
parentage arising from residency/hold out acts. If so, should the same
household residence be required for all or most of the first two years after
birth, as demanded in two UPAs and several state laws? It seems arbitrary
that an aspiring presumed parent should be denied childcare simply
because there were two households, even if only for a little while, as when
the aspiring parent was deployed by the military, or was sent to jail or a
mental health facility, or lived apart for job-related reasons? Some state

248. In re K.M., 2017 IL App (3d) 150274, ¶¶ 17–19 (finding any such agreement would
constitute an unenforceable “personal service contract,” seemingly distinguishing, e.g., marital
dissolution settlements involving parental childcare because in such cases the pacts involve no one
who is a “legal stranger” to the child).
249. See UNIF. NONPARENT CUSTODY & VISITATION ACT § 2(7) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018)
(defining nonparent as “an individual other than a parent of a child,” including “a grandparent,
sibling, or stepparent of the child”).
250. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/602.9 (2020).
251. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Third Party Stepparent Childcare, 67 MERCER L. REV. 383
(2016); Jeffrey A. Parness & Alex Yorko, Nonparental Childcare and Child Contact Orders for
Grandparents, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 95 (2017).
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statutes, following the first UPA,252 have no such two-year residency
requirement,253 though a minimum time of some similar household/hold
out during some time in the child’s life might be required, as it would
respect the superior parental rights of existing legal parents.
D. Differing Custody and Support Norms
Parentage standards often vary by context. Thus, in Illinois the norms
vary for childcare parentage and probate parentage, as only in probate is
there recognized an equitable adoption standard.254
Childcare parentage in Illinois typically encompasses both custodial
interests and support obligations. Whether there are two or more
childcare parents at any one time, an issue worthy of debate involves
whether child support orders should be comparably available against all
legal parents who are responsible for support, including biological,
spousal, intended and adoptive parents. It may be that unwed biological
fathers of children born of consensual sex generally should not be
responsible for support where their potential custodial interests (under
Lehr) have been lost through no significant fault of their own, as by
maternal deception, and where there are already two existing and
supportive legal parents. Such fathers might be distinguished from unwed
biological fathers who intentionally failed to care for their known
children, prompting for them support responsibilities. And it may be that
with assisted reproduction births, custody and support norms should vary
between nonbirth mothers whose genetic materials were or were not used
in prompting pregnancies.
Similarly, differentiated standards may be deemed appropriate for
nonparents who have both potential custody interests and support duties.
Should all nonparents eligible to pursue child parenting
time/visitation/child contact orders be responsible for support even if
parenting time/visitation/contact order is not pursued? Or, should such
eligible nonparents never be, or only sometimes (as with those
biologically tied) be, financially responsible?
E. Nonsurrogacy Assisted Reproduction Births
A fifth issue involves possible expansions of the Illinois Parentage Act
of 2015 on assisted reproduction that add new requirements on
“intended” parentage so that fewer common law precedents are needed
to “determine parentage based on evidence of the parties’ intent at the

252. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1973).
253. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (2020).
254. In re Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 792 (Ill. 2015).
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time of donation.”255 For example, should the Act directly address when,
if at all, there can be no withdrawals of consent to the use the donated
genetic materials, or to future parenthood by one whose genetic materials
will not be used, prior to insemination, a combination of gametes, or
embryo transfer.256 And should the Act directly address the effects of
consent withdrawals after insemination, combination of gametes, or
embryo transfer? Might certain consent withdrawals end child
custody/visitation/contact/parenting time opportunities without ending
child support obligations? Might intended parentage consent withdrawals
undertaken post-insemination have different effects where there are no
new intended parents who join with potential/actual birth mothers in
urging withdrawals be allowed?257
F. Surrogacy Assisted Reproduction Births
A sixth issue involves whether additional surrogacy agreements should
be authorized under the 2005 Gestational Surrogacy Act. As noted, the
Act now fails to recognize genetic, as opposed to gestational, surrogacy;
fails to recognize an intended parent or intended parents who contribute
no gametes; and fails to recognize surrogacy agreements by those with
no “medical need for the gestational surrogacy.”258
The 2017 UPA has such recognitions.259 It can be used by the Illinois
General Assembly to craft new laws, as has been done significantly in
Washington,260 and done less so in Vermont.261 The 2017 UPA could also
be employed by the Illinois Supreme Court, which has found that
common law theories of oral contract or promissory estoppel are
available for legitimating certain assisted reproduction arrangements.262
G. De Facto Parentage
A seventh issue is de facto parentage, which, unlike many same
residency/hold out parentage proposals and laws, does not require a

255. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/703(d) (2020).
256. Id. § 704.
257. See, e.g., E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171 (N.J. Super. 2011) (holding that an agreement
by a birth mother to end parental obligations of the sperm donor for a child born through selfadministered assisted reproduction would not be sanctioned by court where there was no new
adoptive parent).
258. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/10 (2020); id. § 20(b)(1)–(2).
259. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 801–818 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017).
260. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.705 (2020) (noting eligibility to enter gestational or
genetic surrogacy agreements).
261. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 801 (2020) (noting eligibility to enter gestational carrier
agreements).
262. In re M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. 2003).
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common residence since birth, a minimum period of common residence,
or a putative parent to have held the child out as their own natural child.
In considering de facto parentage, the Illinois General Assembly (if not
the Supreme Court) should only recognize it if it is made available for
child support purposes to those seeking monetary help for children as
well as for those seeking continuing court-ordered caretaker
opportunities.263 The 2017 UPA is wrong in limiting standing to pursue
de facto parentage to those who seek such status.264 Child support claims
should at times be available against a de facto parent who does not seek
a caretaking order. By comparison, child support claims seemingly can
be pursued against residency/hold out parents who do not seek a
caretaking order (and who, unlike de facto parents, do not have “bonded
and dependent” relationships).265
H. Voluntary Acknowledgment Parentage
Current Illinois statutes, unlike the 2017 UPA,266 fail to recognize
expressly that VAPs are available to would-be parents beyond alleged
genetic fathers.267 Express recognition seems especially apt for cosigning
presumed spousal parents and males with genetic ties who forego
childcare parentage involving children born of sex, as well as for intended
parents in assisted reproduction settings where genetic material donors
forego parentage. Such availability should sometimes cover both prebirth
and postbirth VAPs.268 VAP parentage provides more certainty (and
stability for children) then, for example, spousal parentage, as VAP
parentage is more difficult to challenge with its fraud/duress/mistake
requirements.

263. While the UPA § 609(a) limits standing to seek de facto parentage to a putative parent
seeking such status, elsewhere de facto parentage can be sought by others, including existing legal
parents, presumedly for child support purposes, as in 13 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 602 (2019).
264. See, e.g., Parness, Comparable Pursuits, supra note 10, at 167–68 (urging the need for
comprehensive de facto parent statutes so that all are on notice of the consequences of parental-like
relations developing for nonparents).
265. The residency/hold out parentage provisions in the 2017 UPA have no such limit on
standing. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); id. § 602
(addressing standing to maintain a proceeding to adjudicate parentage).
266. Id. § 301.
267. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/302(a)(2) (2020) (requiring VAP to be signed by birth
mother and “the man seeking to establish his parentage”); see 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(5)(b)
(2020) (noting that VAP involves “the child’s mother” and “biological father” if the mother was
unwed).
268. Broader prebirth VAPs are recognized in the 2017 UPA. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 304(c)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). Prebirth VAPs by genetic parents are recognized in Illinois. 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 46/304(b) (2020).
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I. Expanded Support Duties for Nonparents
An eighth issue involves whether, and to what extent, child support
duties should be assignable to nonparents, that is, nonparent child support
payable to caretaking parents or to others providing services benefiting
children (e.g., schools), which are independent of any expenses related to
nonparent-child custody, visitation, contact, child caretaking allocation,
or parenting time.
As with nonparental child visitation, child contact (e.g., Skype, iPhone
FaceTime, or parenting time laws), nonparental child support laws can be
general (as with any person who has promised to provide support in an
enforceable agreement) or particular (as with certain persons, like
stepparents, grandparents, great-grandparents, aunts or uncles, or
siblings). These laws can be founded on differing types of conduct by
nonparents, including promissory acts and parental-like acts. Model
NCCUSL laws, ALI Principles, and other state statutes and judicial
precedents can be employed by Illinois lawmakers considering the
expansion of nonparent child support duties.
More general in nature is the recognition in the 2000 ALI Principles of
possible nonparent child support. They say:
The court may in exceptional cases impose a parental support obligation
upon a person who may not be the child’s parent under state law, but
whose prior course of affirmative conduct equitably estops that person
from denying a parental support obligation to the child. Such estoppel
may arise only when there was an explicit or implicit agreement or
undertaking by the person to assume a parental support obligation to the
child; the child was born during the marriage or cohabitation of the
person and the child’s parent; or the child was conceived pursuant to an
agreement between the person and the child’s parent that they would
share responsibility for raising the child and each would be a parent to
the child. Only the child and the child’s parents have standing to assert
an estoppel under this section.269

A somewhat limited, but still general, child support statute in
Connecticut declares that a court may order a “relative or relatives to
contribute to . . . support” for a child who is a ward of the state.270
More particular in nature are state laws expressly recognizing
stepparent or grandparent child support duties. State laws vary on the
extent to which stepparents have child support duties to the children of
269. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3.03(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2002). Elsewhere I have urged that prenuptial and mid-marriage
agreements can include enforceable child support promises by those inside (like prospective or
current stepparents) or outside the marriage. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Prenups and
Midnups, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 343, 364–70 (2015) (urging enforceable child support promises
inside and outside of marriage).
270. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-215(a)(8)(B) (2019).
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their current spouses, with any such support duties usually ending when
the marriage ends (assuming the stepparent is not then, e.g., a
residency/hold out or de facto parent).271
Nonparent grandparents are sometimes subject to child support orders
untethered to any earlier agreements. Current grandparents sometimes are
responsible for providing support for grandchildren when the custodial
parents lack the means to provide for the children or when the parents are
minors. For example, Louisiana requires grandparents “to provide for
their needy descendants . . . limited to the basic necessities of food,
clothing, shelter, and health care.”272 However, such orders are “used
sparingly and as a last resort; and only when attempts at parental support
have been exhausted.”273 Wisconsin requires grandparents to provide
support for grandchildren when the grandchild’s parent is a “dependent
person under the age of eighteen.”274
J. Common Law Parentage and Nonparent Childcare
A ninth issue involves the possible changed roles of the Illinois courts,
as led and directed by the Illinois Supreme Court, in developing common
law precedents supplementing statutes on childcare parentages and/or
nonparent childcare. As noted, for children who are born of sex or who
are adopted, to date the Illinois Supreme Court has deferred to legislators
on many of the issues involving both childcare parentage and nonparent
childcare as they are “complex” and merit a “policy debate” in the
General Assembly. Yet for children born of assisted reproduction, the
Court has recognized some room for common law precedents by
establishing policies which are not dependent upon any constitutional
mandates, as with due process or equality, and which are not directly
dictated by statute.275
A central question is whether Illinois courts can afford to wait for new
written laws. Elsewhere, state courts, while expressing deep concerns
over separation of powers principles, have chosen not to wait as the
changes in human conduct and reproductive technologies demanded
immediate legal response which could not await General Assembly

271. See, e.g., Parness & Timko, Child Support, supra note 239, at 823–26; but see N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-09-09 (2019) (requiring that once a stepparent “receives” their spouse’s dependent
children into their family, the stepparent is liable to support the children both during the marriage
and after its termination if the children remain part of the stepparent’s family).
272. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 237 (2019), applied in Landeche v. Airhart, 372 So. 2d 598, 599–
600 (La. App. 1979).
273. Banquer v. Banquer, 554 So. 2d 790, 792–93 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
274. WIS. STAT. § 49.90(1)(a)(2) (2019).
275. See, e.g., In re M.J., 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ill. 2003) (recognizing common law “theories
of oral contract or promissory estoppel”).
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attention.276 For example, the New York high court observed in 2016 the
following in overruling precedent denying any childcare standing to nonbiological, non-adoptive partners of biological parents:
The “bright-line” rule of Alison D. promotes the laudable goals of
certainty and predictability in the wake of domestic disruption. . . But
bright lines cast a harsh light on. . . injustice and. . . there is little doubt
by whom that injustice has been most finely felt and most finely
perceived. . . We will no longer engage in the “deft legal maneuvering”
necessary to read fairness into an overly-restrictive definition of
“parent” that sets too high a bar for reaching a child’s best interest and
does not take into account equitable principles.277

And, some members of the Maine high court said this in 2014:
Parenthood is meant to be defined by the Legislature, steeped as it is in
matters of policy requiring the weighing of multiple viewpoints . . .
Although we have been discussing de facto parenthood for almost
thirteen years, there is currently no Maine statutory reference to de facto
parenthood. We take this opportunity to again emphasize that, given the
evolving compositions of families and the need for a careful approach,
the issue would be best addressed by the Legislature. In the absence of
Legislative action in such an important and unsettled area, however, we
must provide some guidance to trial courts faced with de facto
parenthood petitions.278

So, should the Illinois Supreme Court continue to defer to (and await)
General Assembly action? If not, in what parentage settings are new
equitable principles needed? Genetic surrogacy? VAPs for women? De
facto parentage? Nonparent visitation/child contact?
CONCLUSION
State childcare parentage laws have evolved significantly in the past
half century, at times in revolutionary ways. State legislators and judges
have responded to the major changes in both reproductive technologies
and family relationships, often guided by NCCUSL and ALI
pronouncements. Unfortunately, Illinois lawmakers have not kept pace,
causing undue uncertainties, unfairness, and disregard of children’s best
interests. Further evolution, if not a revolution, seems inevitable in
Illinois, given likely new reproductive technologies and continuing
changes in Illinois family formations and reformations.

276. For a review of separation of powers issues in parentage cases, see Parness, More
Principled Allocations, supra note 11, at 479.
277. See Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488, 500 (N.Y. 2016) (overruling Alison
D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991), which held there could be no childcare parentage
without a biological or adoptive relation to a child due to the Domestic Relations Law).
278. Pitts v. Moore, 90 A.3d 1169, 1176–77 (Me. 2014) (plurality opinion).
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State childcare parentage laws, prompted by the 2000 and 2017 UPAs,
increasingly recognize forms of nonbiological and nonadoptive childcare
parentage. In particular, there is parentage for a one-time nonbiological
and nonadoptive parent-like figure in an intimate relationship with a
biological or adoptive parent. Illinois state legislators should pay heed
and consider anew who may be recognized as a new childcare parent over
the objections of an existing legal parent or existing legal parents. They
should seek to ensure that all interested persons have participation
opportunities, facilitated perhaps by duties to disclose and/or investigate,
in childcare parentage proceedings. As well, the General Assembly
should consider when someone may be designated as a parent for support
(if not custody) purposes. Finally, Illinois lawmakers should explore,
while employing the 2018 UNCVA, possible new standing norms for
nonparents seeking child caretaking/child contact orders over the
objections of existing legal parents.
In exploring new childcare laws, Illinois legislators should put the best
interests of children first, while always respecting the childcare rights of
existing and expecting legal parents.

